Monitoring Quality of Mafia-Connected Accountants

• 成果类型: Article; Early Access
• 署名作者: Bianchi, Pietro A.; Francis, Jere R.; Marra, Antonio; Pecchiari, Nicola
• 署名单位: Bocconi University; University of Missouri System; University of Missouri Columbia
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING RESEARCH
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0021-8456; 1475-679X
• DOI: 10.1111/1475-679x.70055
• 发表日期: 2026-04-08
• 关键词: monitoring quality; corrupt accountants; connections to organized crime; earnings management; Tax avoidance; accountant criminality; organized-crime; PRIVATE; FIRMS; engagements; management; misconduct

摘要

We investigate the monitoring quality of accountants with ties to the Mafia in their role as auditors for clean firms-those with no known ties to organized crime. Using a proprietary government database, we identify Italian firms with alleged ties to the Mafia through their executives, directors, or shareholders. We define suspect accountants as those who serve as auditors for these Mafia-connected firms, acknowledging their potential associations with criminal entities. We predict and find evidence that clean clients (treatment group) monitored by suspect accountants are more likely to engage in earnings management practices that reduce taxable income, compared with a control sample of clean firms monitored by accountants with no known Mafia ties (control group). Our findings suggest that accountants with ties to the Mafia act as low-quality monitors in the clean economy.