CEO tax effects on corporate misconduct: evidence from CEOs' capital gains taxes

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ge, Rui; Ke, Junqiang; Ma, Zhiming; Ruan, Lufei
• 署名单位: Audencia; Shenzhen University; Central University of Finance & Economics; Peking University; California State University System; San Francisco State University
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF ACCOUNTING STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1380-6653; 1573-7136
• DOI: 10.1007/s11142-026-09945-4
• 发表日期: 2026-06
• 页码: 944-980
• 关键词: CEOs' capital gains taxes; corporate misconduct; Firm risk; CEOs' stock holdings; D22; H24; M12; reputational penalty; equity incentives; RISK; FRAUD; STOCK; governance; earnings; Managers; QUALITY; options

摘要

This study focuses on CEOs' capital gains taxes to shed light on how CEOs' personal tax incentives influence corporate misconduct. We find strong evidence that CEOs' capital gains tax liabilities are negatively associated with corporate misconduct. The results remain robust after controlling for potential endogenous effects. The effect of CEO capital gains taxes on corporate misconduct is attenuated when more of the CEO's wealth is outside the firm and is concentrated among firms facing greater ex ante litigation risk. Overall, our findings suggest that CEOs' capital gains taxes discipline corporate misconduct.