Analyst Rational Inattention: Evidence from CEO Turnover Events

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Godwin, R. Thomas; Goodman, Theodore H.; Small, R. Christopher
• 署名单位: Cornell University; Purdue University System; Purdue University; University of Houston System; University of Houston
• 刊物名称: ACCOUNTING REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0001-4826; 1558-7967
• DOI: 10.2308/TAR-2022-0684
• 发表日期: 2026-05
• 页码: 257-280
• 关键词: Analysts; rational inattention; ceo turnover; limited attention; information-content; FORECAST ACCURACY; succession; management; access; expectations; performance; complexity; ability; IMPACT

摘要

We consider the dynamics of analyst inattention by investigating how analysts allocate their attention when a firm in their portfolio experiences CEO turnover. Our analysis shows that analysts tend to divert their attention toward firms that experience such events, resulting in less attention and a corresponding reduction in forecasting accuracy for nonevent firms. Furthermore, this reduction in accuracy varies with factors related to the costs and benefits of rationally allocating attention to firms that have experienced CEO turnover. Collectively, our analysis responds to the call for research on rational inattention among analysts and illustrates the specific intraportfolio events that alter attention allocation and information.