R&D Disclosure and Short-Term Investors: Evidence from Mandated Patent Disclosure

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Blanco, Ivan; Garcia, Sergio J.; Wehrheim, David
• 署名单位: CUNEF Universidad; University of Navarra; IESE Business School
• 刊物名称: ACCOUNTING REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0001-4826; 1558-7967
• DOI: 10.2308/TAR-2025-0077
• 发表日期: 2026-07
• 页码: 115-136
• 关键词: R&D disclosure; short-term investors; INSTITUTIONAL OWNERSHIP; Informed trading; pre-disclosure trading; patent disclosure mandates; institutional investors; private information; public disclosure; earnings; MARKET; liquidity; BEHAVIOR

摘要

We examine how the prospect of research and development (R&D) disclosure affects a firm's institutional investor base. Difference-in-differences (DiD) regressions around the enactment of the American Inventors Protection Act (AIPA), which mandated the public disclosure of patent applications within 18 months of filing, show that short-term institutional investors increase their holdings before public information is released, whereas long-term investors do not adjust their positions. This anticipatory shift is consistent with theoretical predictions that expected disclosure strengthens short-horizon investors' incentives to acquire and trade on private information. We further document that stock prices reflect more firm-specific information leading up to disclosure and that improved liquidity at disclosure enables short-term investors to partially unwind their positions. Our paper offers novel evidence on how increases in the expected likelihood of disclosure shape investor behavior and the composition of firms' investor bases.