Playing with time: data manipulation within the performance evaluation cycle

• 成果类型: Article; Early Access
• 署名作者: Li, Jiayuan; Chen, Zhibin; Cui, Manqian; Zhang, Xuelian
• 署名单位: Sun Yat Sen University; LingNan Normal University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION RESEARCH AND THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1053-1858; 1477-9803
• DOI: 10.1093/jopart/muag017
• 发表日期: 2026-07-23
• 关键词: performance evaluation cycle; gaming; multilevel modeling; CHINA; earnings management; incentives; target; gdp; DYNAMICS; english; GROWTH

摘要

Understanding why public organizations manipulate performance data has become an essential theme in public administration scholarship. While prior research has extensively explored the individual and contextual drivers of gaming, the temporal dimension-specifically when manipulation occurs-remains remarkably underexplored. Moving beyond the impact of sporadic political events, this study examines the routine, institutionalized rhythms of the bureaucratic calendar. Utilizing satellite nighttime light data as an objective benchmark to detect distortion in officially reported GDP across 271 Chinese cities (2013-2020), we uncover a systematic, cyclical pattern of strategic gaming. Manipulation is substantial in the first quarter, consistent with political pressure for a good start, recedes during the middle of the year; and surges to its annual peak in the fourth quarter (Q4) as the final performance assessment looms. Furthermore, we show that this Q4 effect is contingent on local context: cities with lower fiscal autonomy and reduced marketization exhibit a significantly greater propensity to inflate year-end figures. By uncovering a routine form of manipulation embedded in bureaucratic practices, our study advances theories of performance gaming and sheds light on the strategic use of time in public management.