The Impact of Active Engagement With Performance Information on Citizens Views on Public Services: A Budget Game Experiment

• 成果类型: Article; Early Access
• 署名作者: Haggblom, Erasmus; Kleizen, Bjorn; Van Dooren, Wouter
• 署名单位: University of Antwerp
• 刊物名称: PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0033-3298; 1467-9299
• DOI: 10.1111/padm.70048
• 发表日期: 2026-02-08
• 关键词: active engagement; Online experiment; performance information; Political trust; VOICE BEHAVIOR; EXPECTANCY-DISCONFIRMATION THEORY; quality evidence; satisfaction; perceptions; coproduction; expectations; CHOICE; VOICE; care

摘要

This study uses a budget game experiment to study the effects of active engagement with performance information on citizens' trust in public services and voice behavior regarding those services. Participants reviewed performance information on two fictional schools, one low-performing and one high-performing, after which some participants played the budget game. Participants who participated in the game expressed lower trust in and higher subjective voice regarding both the low-performing and high-performing school than participants given only a short description of the schools, with a particularly strong effect on the higher-performing school. Playing the game also decreased the negative effects of performance information on the lower-performing school. The results suggest that actively engaged citizens are more likely to view service performance in a negative manner, but also that active engagement reduces the perceived differences between high-performing and low-performing services.