Defensive Compliance in Corporate Criminal Justice: Effects of Compliance Programs on Organizational Prosecution and Punishment

• 成果类型: Article; Early Access
• 署名作者: Huang, Li
• 署名单位: Seattle University
• 刊物名称: REGULATION & GOVERNANCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1748-5983; 1748-5991
• DOI: 10.1111/rego.70119
• 发表日期: 2026-01-21
• 关键词: compliance programs; corporate prosecution; corporate punishment; defensive compliance; preventive compliance; ETHICS; crime; liability; state

摘要

Business organizations have increasingly adopted compliance strategies in response to heightened regulatory requirements. Prior research has examined the role of compliance programs in curbing unethical behavior and enhancing corporate governance, but it has often overlooked their defensive function and proactive role in legal risk management. This paper develops the concept of defensive compliance and investigates whether compliance programs reduce corporate criminal liability and punishment through prosecutorial and sentencing decisions and outcomes. Analyses of US Sentencing Commission organizational offender data provide some evidence of defensive compliance: fewer conviction counts, reduced fines (only during the Biden administration), and shorter probation terms. However, its effects are muted or even reversed in other outcomes or contexts. The results also show little support for the propositions that public company status and managerial involvement moderate defensive compliance. These findings suggest that the efficacy of defensive compliance evolves over time and is highly context-dependent. Future research should further develop the defensive compliance framework and examine its operation across varied institutional settings.