Strategic communication among banks

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bittner, Christian; Fecht, Falko; Pala, Melissa; Saidi, Farzad
• 署名单位: Deutsche Bundesbank; Goethe University Frankfurt; Frankfurt School Finance & Management; University of Bonn
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-405X
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2026.104338
• 发表日期: 2026-10
• 页码: 104338
• 关键词: Bank networks; TRADING; information transmission; Mergers and Acquisitions; Syndicated lending; INVESTMENT-BANKING; Board connections; mergers; MARKET; announcements; acquisitions; INFORMATION; returns; cash; firm

摘要

How do bank networks facilitate information flows that shape market outcomes? Using international banks' advisory activities in corporate takeovers as their source of private information, we show in supervisory data that banks with closer ties to the target, but not the acquirer, advisor trade profitably in the target's stock prior to the deal announcement. This trading behavior is associated with a higher premium paid without compromising deal success. As connected banks' incentives are aligned only with target shareholders' interests, which are represented by the target advisor, our evidence suggests that economic incentives determine which banks share information and with whom.