Resilience in collective bargaining

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Avenancio-Leon, Carlos F.; Piccolo, Alessio; Pinto, Roberto
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California San Diego; Indiana University System; IU Kelley School of Business; Indiana University Bloomington; Lancaster University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-405X
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2025.104157
• 发表日期: 2025-11
• 页码: 104157
• 关键词: Labor unions; Right-to-work laws; bargaining; debt structure; to-work laws; capital structure; financial-markets; LABOR; debt; leverage; unions; IMPACT; equilibrium; INEQUALITY

摘要

A central finding of the theoretical literature on bargaining is that parties' attitudes towards delay influence bargaining outcomes. However, the ability to endure delays, resilience, is often private information and hard to measure in most real-world contexts. In the context of collective bargaining, we show firms actively attempt to become financially resilient in anticipation of labor negotiations. Firms adjust their financial resilience to respond to the passage of right-to-work laws (RWLs). Unions' financial structure also responds to RWLs. Our findings suggest resilience is key to understanding the process through which collective bargaining determines wages.