Can Discount Window Stigma Be Cured? An Experimental Investigation

• 成果类型: Article; Early Access
• 署名作者: Armantier, Olivier; Holt, Charles
• 署名单位: Chapman University System; Chapman University; University of Virginia
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0893-9454; 1465-7368
• DOI: 10.1093/rfs/hhag013
• 发表日期: 2026-06-24
• 关键词: E58; G01; C92; adverse selection; LAST RESORT; lender; RELUCTANCE; BORROW

摘要

A core responsibility of the Federal Reserve is to ensure financial stability by acting as the lender of last resort through its Discount Window (DW). The DW, however, has not been effective because its usage is stigmatized. In this paper, we use theory and experiments to study how such stigma can be cured. We find that behavioral inertia makes it difficult to fix a stigmatized DW, but adding a new backstop facility can help mitigate stigma. These results are consistent with the Federal Reserve's experience.