Voting and Trading on Public Information

• 成果类型: Article; Early Access
• 署名作者: Parlasca, Markus; Voss, Paul
• 署名单位: Vienna University of Economics & Business; Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0893-9454; 1465-7368
• DOI: 10.1093/rfs/hhag035
• 发表日期: 2026-05-13
• 关键词: D72; D82; G34; K22; SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM; MARKET-EFFICIENCY; social value; governance; aggregation; liquidity; ELECTIONS

摘要

This paper studies how public information, such as proxy advice, affects shareholder voting and, thus, corporate decision-making. We find that while public information improves the voting decisions of uninformed shareholders, it also induces privately informed shareholders to exit rather than to exercise their voice (vote). As a result, public information impairs information aggregation by voting but improves information aggregation by trading. Overall, public information can undermine corporate decision-making. Furthermore, slightly more precise public information can lead to a discontinuous reduction in firm value. Our results give rise to new empirical predictions and have implications for regulation.