Financial Restructuring and Resolution of Banks

• 成果类型: Article; Early Access
• 署名作者: Colliard, Jean-Edouard; Gromb, Denis
• 署名单位: Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0893-9454; 1465-7368
• DOI: 10.1093/rfs/hhaf113
• 发表日期: 2026-03-09
• 关键词: G21; G28; strategic delay; signaling games; bankruptcy; liquidity

摘要

How do resolution frameworks affect the private restructuring of distressed banks? We model a bank's shareholders and creditors negotiating a restructuring, under two frictions: asymmetric information about asset quality and externalities on the government. High-quality banks signal themselves by delaying the negotiation, which is socially inefficient. Public policies can improve welfare if they reduce the signaling motive or increase the negotiation surplus. Stricter bail-in rules make debt more information sensitive and increase delays. The bank chooses a capital structure with too little renegotiable debt, giving a new rationale, for example, for Total Loss Absorbing Capacity requirements.