Political Accountability During Crises: Evidence From 40 Years of Financial Policies

• 成果类型: Article; Early Access
• 署名作者: Saka, Orkun; Ji, Yuemei; Minaudier, Clement
• 署名单位: University of London; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut; University of London; University College London
• 刊物名称: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0020-6598
• DOI: 10.1111/iere.70091
• 发表日期: 2026
• 关键词: REVOLVING-DOOR LOBBYISTS; electoral accountability; CONGRESSIONAL VOTES; dynamic-models; term limits; ECONOMY; reforms; institutions; connections; interests

摘要

We show that politicians facing a binding term limit are more likely to engage in financial deliberalization than those facing reelection, but only in the wake of a financial crisis. In particular, they implement policies that tend to favor incumbent financial institutions over the general population, such as increasing barriers to entry in the banking sector. We propose a conceptual framework and several mechanisms to rationalize this behavior and show that revolving doors between the government and the financial sector play a key role in encouraging bank-friendly policies after crises.