Optimal Unemployment Insurance Requirements

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: de Souza, Gustavo; Luduvice, Andre Victor D.
• 署名单位: Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Chicago; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Cleveland
• 刊物名称: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0020-6598
• DOI: 10.1111/iere.70061
• 发表日期: 2026
• 关键词: risk

摘要

In the United States, workers must satisfy two requirements to receive unemployment insurance (UI): a tenure requirement of a minimum work spell and a monetary requirement of past minimum earnings. Using discontinuity of UI rules at state borders, we find that both requirements reduce unemployment and that the monetary requirement decreases the number of employers and the share of part-time workers, while the tenure requirement has the opposite effect. We develop a heterogeneous agents model with history-dependent UI benefits to explain these results and quantify an optimal utilitarian UI design. The optimal policy has a high monetary and a short tenure requirement.