Should Platforms be Held Liable for Defective Third-Party Goods?

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Zennyo, Yusuke
• 署名单位: Kobe University
• 刊物名称: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0020-6598
• DOI: 10.1111/iere.70051
• 发表日期: 2026
• 关键词: PRODUCT-SAFETY; liability; COMPETITION; rules

摘要

This paper develops a model of platform liability for ex post compensation of consumer harm caused by third-party sellers. A platform chooses how liability is shared with sellers, but assumes no liability because it reduces sellers' safety investments. Mandated platform liability can increase or decrease consumer surplus: it is more likely to be beneficial when the platform has weak market power or faces competition, but less so when it sells first-party goods or third-party sellers are judgment-proof. When the platform invests in screening judgment-proof sellers, liability regulation encourages investment, increasing welfare gains. Regulations targeting only incumbents may deter platform entry.