Platform Liability and Innovation

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Jeon, Doh-Shin; Lefouili, Yassine; Madio, Leonardo
• 署名单位: Communaute d'universites et etablissements de Toulouse (Comue); Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; University of Padua
• 刊物名称: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0020-6598
• DOI: 10.1111/iere.70045
• 发表日期: 2026
• 关键词: PRODUCT LIABILITY; COMPETITION

摘要

We study a platform's incentives to remove IP-infringing products and the effects of holding the platform liable for such infringements on innovation and welfare. We first show that platform liability can lead to either higher or lower commission rates, depending on how screening affects transaction volume. We then show that liability may spur or hinder innovation, depending on the intensity of cross-group network externalities, which determines participation elasticities on each side. If platform liability lowers innovation, all market participants-the platform, innovators, imitators, and buyers-are worse off. We also provide a sufficient condition for platform liability to raise welfare.