Super-Nash Performance

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ismail, Mehmet S.
• 署名单位: University of London; King's College London
• 刊物名称: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0020-6598
• DOI: 10.1111/iere.12764
• 发表日期: 2025
• 关键词: NORMAL-FORM; uncoupled dynamics; centipede game; equilibrium; COOPERATION; BEHAVIOR; uncertainty; dilemma; THEOREM; CHOICE

摘要

In this paper, I introduce a novel benchmark in games, super-Nash performance, and a solution concept, optimin, whereby players maximize their minimal payoff under unilateral profitable deviations by other players. Optimin achieves super-Nash performance in that, for every Nash equilibrium, there exists an optimin where each player not only receives but also guarantees super-Nash payoffs under unilateral profitable deviations by others. Furthermore, optimin generalizes Nash equilibrium in -person constant-sum games and coincides with it when . Finally, optimin is consistent with the direction of non-Nash deviations in games in which cooperation has been extensively studied.