Hurricanes, Climate Change Policies, and Electoral Accountability

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Gagliarducci, Stefano; Paserman, M. Daniele; Patacchini, Eleonora
• 署名单位: University of Rome Tor Vergata; IZA Institute Labor Economics; Boston University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; Cornell University
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-ECONOMIC POLICY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7731
• DOI: 10.1257/pol.20230070
• 发表日期: 2026
• 关键词: clean-air act; natural disasters; political-economy; risk perception; weather; preferences; voters; MODEL; party

摘要

This paper studies the conditions under which legislators promote policies that may be unpopular in the short term but yield long-term benefits. Using data on the universe of federal disaster declarations from 1989 to 2020, we document that representatives from congressional districts impacted by hurricanes are more inclined to support environmental legislation addressing climate change. However, this response depends on political circumstances: Only those in safe seats can change their political agenda toward policies that involve short-term costs for long-term gains. These results highlight the role of electoral incentives in shaping politicians' attitudes toward farsighted policymaking. (JEL D72, Q54, Q58)