Take-up of Social Benefits: Experimental Evidence from France

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Castell, Laura; Gurgand, Marc; Imbert, Clement; Tochev, Todor
• 署名单位: Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Paris School of Economics; Universite PSL; Ecole Normale Superieure (ENS); Institut d'Etudes Politiques Paris (Sciences Po)
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-ECONOMIC POLICY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7731
• DOI: 10.1257/pol.20220786
• 发表日期: 2025
• 关键词: administrative burden; state; INFORMATION; decisions; inference

摘要

We report on two nationwide experiments with job seekers in France. We first show that a meeting with social services to assess eligibility and help with applications to social benefits increased new benefit take-up by 29 percent. By contrast, an online simulator that gave personalized information on benefit eligibility did not increase take-up. Marginal treatment effects show that individuals who benefit the most from the meetings are the least likely to attend. Overall, without ruling out information frictions, our results suggest that transaction costs represent the main obstacle to applying for benefits or accessing government's assistance in applying. (JEL D83, I38, J22, J65, R38)