Disrupting Drug Markets: The Effects of Crackdowns on Rogue Opioid Suppliers

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Soliman, Adam
• 署名单位: University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-ECONOMIC POLICY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7731
• DOI: 10.1257/pol.20230640
• 发表日期: 2025
• 关键词: abuse; methamphetamine; ENFORCEMENT

摘要

This paper estimates the impact of doctor crackdowns on the quantity demanded of prescription opioids, across-market substitution, and across-product substitution. Exploiting plausibly exogenous variation in the timing and location of administrative actions, I find cracking down on a single doctor decreases county-level opioid dispensing by 10 percent. This decline persists across space and grows over time. Additionally, significant heroin substitution occurs, yet overall overdose mortality decreases. These results highlight a critical tradeoff policymakers should consider with targeted crackdowns: Reductions in the flow of new users must be balanced against the harm that arises when existing users substitute to more dangerous drugs. (JEL I11, I12, I18, K42)