The Selective Disclosure of Evidence: An Experiment

成果类型:
Article; Early Access
署名作者:
Farina, Agata; Frechette, Guillaume R.; Ispano, Alessandro; Lizzeri, Alessandro; Perego, Jacopo
署名单位:
University of Chicago; New York University; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Institut de Recherche pour le Developpement (IRD); Universite PSL; Laboratoire dEconomie de Dauphine LEDa; Universite Paris-Dauphine; Institut Universitaire de France; Princeton University; Columbia University
刊物名称:
REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES
ISSN/ISSBN:
0034-6527
DOI:
10.1093/restud/rdag076
发表日期:
2026
关键词:
information-transmission COMMUNICATION deception persuasion EVOLUTION QUALITY online rules tests
摘要:
We conduct an experimental analysis of selective disclosure in communication. In the model, an informed sender aims to influence a receiver by disclosing verifiable evidence that is selected from a larger pool of available evidence. Our experimental design leverages this model's rich comparative statics, allowing us to systematically quantify the effects of selection relative to concealment. Our findings confirm the key qualitative predictions of the theory, suggesting that selection, rather than concealment, is often the dominant distortion in communication. We also identify deviations from the theory: Some senders are deception averse and overcommunicate relative to predictions; receivers respond too optimistically to both concealed and selected evidence, with errors of similar magnitude. Yet selection generates greater overall distortion in receiver behaviour because it is far more prevalent than concealment.