Organizational Change and Reference-Dependent Preferences

• 成果类型: Article; Early Access
• 署名作者: Schmidt, Klaus M.; Von Wangenheim, Jonas
• 署名单位: University of Munich; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); University of Bonn
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0034-6527
• DOI: 10.1093/restud/rdag009
• 发表日期: 2026
• 关键词: Loss aversion; PRODUCTIVITY

摘要

Reference-dependent preferences can explain several puzzling observations about organizational change. We introduce a dynamic model in which a firm bargains with loss-averse workers about organizational change and wages. We show that change is often stagnant or slow for many periods, followed by a sudden boost in productivity triggered by a crisis. In a crisis, workers concede to organizational change but resist nominal wage reductions. In addition, the model explains why different firms in the same industry often have significant productivity differences. Finally, the model demonstrates the importance of expectations management even if all parties have rational expectations.