School Choice and the Housing Market

• 成果类型: Article; Early Access
• 署名作者: Grigoryan, Aram
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California San Diego
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0034-6527
• DOI: 10.1093/restud/rdag065
• 发表日期: 2026
• 关键词: assignment; COMPETITION; DESIGN

摘要

I develop a unified theoretical framework with schools and residential choices to study the welfare consequences of public schools' switching from the traditional neighbourhood assignment to the deferred acceptance mechanism. I find that when families receive higher priorities at neighbourhood schools, the deferred acceptance mechanism creates higher aggregate or utilitarian welfare than neighbourhood assignment. Under a common school ranking assumption, I also show that the deferred acceptance creates higher aggregate welfare with neighbourhood priorities than without them.