A Dynamic Theory of Random Price Discounts

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Dilme, Francesc; Garrett, Daniel F.
• 署名单位: University of Bonn; University of Essex
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0034-6527
• DOI: 10.1093/restud/rdaf074
• 发表日期: 2026
• 关键词: DURABLE-GOODS MONOPOLY; DISCRIMINATION; consumers; sales; MODEL; auctions

摘要

A seller with commitment power sets prices over time. Risk-averse buyers arrive to the market and decide when to purchase. We show that it is optimal for the seller to choose a constant high price punctuated by occasional episodes of sequential discounts that occur at random times. This optimal price-path has the property that the price a buyer ends up paying is independent of his arrival and purchase times, and only depends on his valuation. Our theory accommodates empirical findings on the timing of discounts.