The Social Tax: Redistributive Pressure and Labor Supply

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Carranza, Eliana; Donald, Aletheia; Grosset-touba, Florian; Kaur, Supreet
• 署名单位: The World Bank; The World Bank; Institut Polytechnique de Paris; ENSAE Paris; University of California System; University of California Berkeley; University of Cambridge
• 刊物名称: ECONOMETRICA
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0012-9682
• DOI: 10.3982/ECTA21078
• 发表日期: 2025
• 关键词: risk-sharing networks; field experiment; self-control; income; insurance; consumption; COMMITMENT; FAMILY; constraints; INFORMATION

摘要

In low-income communities in both rich and poor countries, redistributive transfers within kin and social networks are frequent. Such arrangements may distort labor supply-acting as a social tax that dampens the incentive to work. We document that across countries, from the United States to C & ocirc;te d'Ivoire, low-income groups report strong pressure to share earned income with others; in addition, social groups that undertake more interpersonal transfers work fewer hours. Using a field experiment, we enable piece-rate factory workers in C & ocirc;te d'Ivoire to shield income using blocked savings accounts over 9 months. Workers may only deposit earnings increases, relative to baseline, mitigating income effects on labor supply. Offering Private accounts raises work attendance by 6.5% and earnings by 9.4%. These treatment effects are concentrated among workers who report higher redistributive pressure at baseline. To obtain further suggestive evidence on mechanisms, in a supplementary experiment, we vary whether blocked accounts are private or known to the worker's network. When accounts are private, take-up is substantively higher (60% vs. 14%), with a resultant 8.8% higher earnings. Outgoing transfers do not decline, indicating no loss in redistribution. The welfare benefits of informal redistribution may come at a cost, depressing labor supply and productivity.