Spillover effects of cross-border bank acquisitions on systemic risk

• 成果类型: Article; Early Access
• 署名作者: Sedunov, John; Taboada, Alvaro G.
• 署名单位: Villanova University; Mississippi State University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2506
• DOI: 10.1057/s41267-026-00861-y
• 发表日期: 2026
• 关键词: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; NONINTEREST INCOME; Foreign banks; COMPETITION; liability; mergers; MARKET; institutions; countries; follow

摘要

Using a sample of 639 cross-border bank acquisitions in 65 countries from 1995 to 2019, we examine the spillover effects of such acquisitions on the systemic risk of non-target (peer) banks in host countries. We find that cross-border bank acquisitions lead to increases in peer banks' systemic risk. We evaluate competing hypotheses related to moderating institutional factors and to the underlying channels at work. Our findings show that CB bank acquisitions lower peer banks' market and pricing power, which leads them to shift towards more volatile non-interest income activities. The shift towards such fee-based activities, which tend to be more cyclical and require less capital, leads to a buildup in systemic risk. We find little evidence of a credit risk or funding-shock channel at work. The adverse spillover effects are mitigated in host countries where peer banks are likely to enjoy informational advantages over foreign entrants due to their higher liability of foreignness. Specifically, the spillover effects are mitigated for peer banks in host countries with a culture that is less open and trusting of foreigners, and in countries with stronger bank supervision. Our findings contribute to the ongoing debate about the benefits and costs of bank globalization. The article explores the impact of cross-border (CB) bank acquisitions on the financial stability of peer banks in host countries. While foreign banks can enhance financial stability by introducing better practices, they can also increase systemic risk by intensifying competition and pushing local banks to take on more risks. The study aims to fill the gap in understanding how CB bank acquisitions affect the systemic risk of peer banks and examines the role of host-country characteristics in moderating these effects.This article uses a large international dataset of 639 CB bank acquisitions from 1995 to 2019 across 65 countries. The authors employ a cohort approach and stacked difference-in-differences (DiD) regressions to isolate the effects of CB acquisitions on systemic risk. The stacked DiD method is a statistical technique that helps compare changes over time between groups that experience an event (treatment group) and those that do not (control group). The study finds that CB bank acquisitions increase systemic risk for peer banks. This is attributed to a shift towards more volatile non-interest income activities, rather than changes in loan portfolio risk or funding sources. The study also examines how host-country characteristics, such as cultural attitudes towards foreigners and the strength of banking regulations, influence these effects. It finds that countries with a greater distrust of foreigners and stronger bank supervision experience fewer adverse effects from CB bank acquisitions.The results show that CB bank acquisitions lead to increased systemic risk for peer banks by reducing their market and pricing power, prompting them to engage in riskier activities. The study concludes that while globalization can bring benefits, it also poses hidden risks to financial stability in host countries. The findings highlight the importance of strong regulatory frameworks and cultural factors in mitigating these risks. The study contributes to the broader debate on the costs and benefits of globalization and suggests that regulators should consider these factors when approving CB bank acquisitions. Future research could explore the long-term effects of CB bank acquisitions on financial stability and the role of other institutional factors.This text was initially drafted using artificial intelligence, then reviewed by the author(s) to ensure accuracy. En utilisant un & eacute;chantillon de 639 acquisitions bancaires transfrontali & egrave;res dans 65 pays entre 1995 et 2019, nous examinons les effets de d & eacute;bordement de ces acquisitions sur le risque syst & eacute;mique des banques (homologues) non cibl & eacute;es dans les pays h & ocirc;tes. Nous observons que les acquisitions bancaires transfrontali & egrave;res entra & icirc;nent une augmentation du risque syst & eacute;mique des banques homologues. Nous & eacute;valuons des hypoth & egrave;ses concurrentes li & eacute;es aux facteurs institutionnels mod & eacute;rateurs et aux canaux sous-jacents & agrave; l'oe uvre. Nos r & eacute;sultats montrent que les acquisitions bancaires transfrontali & egrave;res r & eacute;duisent le pouvoir de march & eacute; et de fixation des prix des banques homologues, ce qui les pousse & agrave; se tourner vers des activit & eacute;s g & eacute;n & eacute;ratrices de revenus non li & eacute;es aux int & eacute;r & ecirc;ts, plus volatiles. Cette transition vers de telles activit & eacute;s bas & eacute;es sur les frais, lesquelles ont tendance & agrave; & ecirc;tre plus cycliques et & agrave; n & eacute;cessiter moins de capitaux, conduit & agrave; une accumulation de risque syst & eacute;mique. Nous trouvons peu de preuves indiquant l'existence d'un canal li & eacute; au risque de cr & eacute;dit ou & agrave; un choc de financement. Les effets n & eacute;gatifs de d & eacute;bordement sont att & eacute;nu & eacute;s dans les pays h & ocirc;tes o & ugrave; les banques homologues sont susceptibles de b & eacute;n & eacute;ficier d'avantages informationnels par rapport aux nouveaux entrants & eacute;trangers en raison des plus grands co & ucirc;ts et handicaps li & eacute;s au statut & eacute;tranger de ces derniers (Liability of Foreignness). Plus pr & eacute;cis & eacute;ment, les effets de d & eacute;bordement sont att & eacute;nu & eacute;s pour les banques homologues dans les pays h & ocirc;tes ayant une culture moins ouverte et moins confiante envers les & eacute;trangers, ainsi que dans les pays dot & eacute;s d'une supervision bancaire plus stricte. Nos r & eacute;sultats contribuent au d & eacute;bat actuel sur les avantages et les co & ucirc;ts de la mondialisation bancaire. Usando una muestra de 639 adquisiciones bancarias transfronterizas en 65 pa & iacute;ses entre 1995 y 2019, examinamos los efectos de contagio de dichas adquisiciones sobre el riesgo sist & eacute;mico de los bancos no objetivos (pares) en los pa & iacute;ses anfitriones. Encontramos que las adquisiciones bancarias transfronterizas conducen a un aumento en el riesgo sist & eacute;mico de los bancos pares. Evaluamos hip & oacute;tesis contrapuestas relacionadas con factores institucionales moderadores y con los canales subyacentes en funcionamiento. Nuestros hallazgos muestran que las adquisiciones bancarias transfronterizas reducen el poder de mercado y de fijaci & oacute;n de precios de los bancos pares, lo que los lleva a orientarse hacia actividades de ingresos no financieros m & aacute;s vol & aacute;tiles. Este cambio hacia actividades basadas en comisiones, que tienden a ser m & aacute;s c & iacute;clicas y requieren menos capital, genera un aumento en el riesgo sist & eacute;mico. Encontramos poca evidencia de que est & eacute;n en funcionamiento canales relacionados con el riesgo crediticio o con choques de financiamiento. Los efectos adversos de contagio se mitigan en los pa & iacute;ses anfitriones donde los bancos pares probablemente disfruten de ventajas informativas en comparaci & oacute;n con los nuevos entrantes extranjeros debido a una mayor liability of foreignness (desventaja de extranjer & iacute;a). En particular, los efectos de contagio se reducen para los bancos pares en pa & iacute;ses anfitriones con una cultura menos abierta y confiada hacia los extranjeros, y en pa & iacute;ses con una supervisi & oacute;n bancaria m & aacute;s estricta. Nuestros hallazgos contribuyen al debate en curso sobre los beneficios y costos de la globalizaci & oacute;n bancaria. Usando uma amostra de 639 aquisi & ccedil;& otilde;es banc & aacute;rias transfronteiri & ccedil;as em 65 pa & iacute;ses no per & iacute;odo de 1995 a 2019, examinamos os efeitos de transbordamento dessas aquisi & ccedil;& otilde;es sobre o risco sist & ecirc;mico de bancos n & atilde;o-alvo (pares) nos pa & iacute;ses anfitri & otilde;es. Descobrimos que aquisi & ccedil;& otilde;es banc & aacute;rias transfronteiri & ccedil;as levam a aumentos no risco sist & ecirc;mico dos bancos pares. Avaliamos hip & oacute;teses concorrentes relacionadas a fatores institucionais moderadores e a canais subjacentes em funcionamento. Nossas descobertas mostram que as aquisi & ccedil;& otilde;es banc & aacute;rias transfronteiri & ccedil;as reduzem o poder de mercado e de precifica & ccedil;& atilde;o dos bancos pares, levando-os a se deslocarem para atividades de receita n & atilde;o proveniente de juros, mais vol & aacute;teis. A mudan & ccedil;a para essas atividades tarif & aacute;rias, que tendem a ser mais c & iacute;clicas e a exigir menos capital, resulta em um aumento do risco sist & ecirc;mico. Encontramos poucas evid & ecirc;ncias de risco de cr & eacute;dito ou de que um canal de choque de financiamento esteja em opera & ccedil;& atilde;o. Os efeitos adversos do transbordamento s & atilde;o mitigados em pa & iacute;ses anfitri & otilde;es, onde os bancos pares provavelmente desfrutam de vantagens informacionais em rela & ccedil;& atilde;o aos entrantes estrangeiros, devido & agrave; maior desvantagem de ser estrangeiro. Especificamente, os efeitos de transbordamento s & atilde;o mitigados em bancos pares em pa & iacute;ses anfitri & otilde;es com uma cultura menos aberta e menos confiante em rela & ccedil;& atilde;o a estrangeiros, e em pa & iacute;ses com supervis & atilde;o banc & aacute;ria mais rigorosa. Nossas descobertas contribuem para o debate em curso sobre os benef & iacute;cios e custos da globaliza & ccedil;& atilde;o banc & aacute;ria. 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