Financial statement comparability and employment stability around the world

• 成果类型: Article; Early Access
• 署名作者: Khurana, Inder K.; Zhong, Rong Irene
• 署名单位: University of Missouri Columbia; University of Missouri System; University of Missouri Columbia; University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Chicago; University of Illinois Chicago Hospital
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2506
• DOI: 10.1057/s41267-026-00843-0
• 发表日期: 2026
• 关键词: MANDATORY IFRS ADOPTION; implicit contracts; wage insurance; INFORMATION; LABOR; COSTS; management; literacy; exchange; BEHAVIOR

摘要

In a global economy prone to demand shocks, firms increasingly rely on implicit contracts to stabilize employment. We investigate whether financial statement comparability strengthens these contracts by enabling employees to benchmark their firm's performance against that of peers, facilitating mutual risk sharing. Using firm-level data from 44 countries, we find that higher comparability reduces layoffs during downturns and tempers aggressive hiring during upturns, consistent with balanced labor adjustment under implicit contracting. Employees at high-comparability firms are also more willing to accept lower wages without compromising productivity, reflecting enhanced trust and cooperation. Further analyses suggest that comparability improves employees' ability to monitor firm behavior, particularly when social safety nets are strong, earnings are transparent, industries are competitive, and firms deviate from peer norms. Exploiting the mandatory adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) as an exogenous shock to comparability supports causal inference. Overall, our findings highlight comparability as a powerful governance mechanism that aligns firm-employee incentives in implicit employment contracts and offers practical guidance for managers and policymakers seeking to strengthen labor market resilience across diverse institutional contexts. In today's fast-paced global economy, firms face the challenge of maintaining stable employment during demand shocks, which can lead to job cuts and societal costs. While public safety nets like unemployment insurance exist, they often fall short due to enforcement issues. This study explores whether financial statement comparability can enhance the credibility of implicit employment contracts-informal agreements between employers and employees-thereby promoting better risk sharing and employment stability. Comparability refers to the similarity of accounting systems in reflecting economic events in earnings. It helps employees compare their firm's performance with industry peers, making firm actions more transparent and trustworthy.This article investigates how financial statement comparability affects firm-employee risk sharing during demand shocks. The study uses data from 44 countries over 27 years, focusing on how firms adjust employment in response to demand changes. The researchers measure comparability by comparing a firm's accounting system with its domestic peers. They analyze whether higher comparability leads to better implicit insurance for employees during demand shocks. The study finds that firms with more comparable financial reporting are less likely to lay off workers during downturns and less likely to expand aggressively during upturns. This suggests that comparability leads to more balanced employment adjustments. The researchers also examine whether comparability improves employee monitoring, finding that it increases employees' willingness to accept wage flexibility in exchange for job stability.The results show that higher financial statement comparability reduces the impact of demand shocks on employment, indicating stronger implicit insurance for employees. Firms with more comparable reporting are less likely to lay off workers during negative shocks and less likely to over-hire during positive shocks. This balanced approach suggests that comparability supports efficient risk sharing. The study concludes that comparability enhances trust and cooperation between firms and employees, promoting employment stability. These findings highlight the importance of comparability in labor markets, suggesting that it can improve organizational resilience and economic performance. Future implications include the potential for comparability to serve as a governance mechanism that fosters trust and efficiency in labor arrangements across different institutional settings.This text was initially drafted using artificial intelligence, then reviewed by the author(s) to ensure accuracy. Dans une & eacute;conomie mondiale sujette aux chocs de demande, les entreprises s'appuient de plus en plus sur des contrats implicites pour stabiliser l'emploi. Nous examinons si la comparabilit & eacute; des & eacute;tats financiers renforce ces contrats en permettant aux employ & eacute;s de comparer la performance de leur entreprise & agrave; celle de leurs pairs, facilitant ainsi un partage mutuel des risques. En utilisant des donn & eacute;es au niveau de l'entreprise provenant de 44 pays, nous constatons qu'une comparabilit & eacute; plus & eacute;lev & eacute;e r & eacute;duit les licenciements pendant les p & eacute;riodes de r & eacute;cession, et mod & egrave;re les embauches agressives lors des p & eacute;riodes de reprise, ce qui est coh & eacute;rent avec un ajustement & eacute;quilibr & eacute; de la main-d'oeuvre dans le cadre de contrats implicites. Les employ & eacute;s des entreprises & agrave; forte comparabilit & eacute; sont & eacute;galement plus dispos & eacute;s & agrave; accepter des salaires plus bas sans compromettre leur productivit & eacute;, refl & eacute;tant une confiance et une coop & eacute;ration accrues. Des analyses suppl & eacute;mentaires sugg & egrave;rent que la comparabilit & eacute; am & eacute;liore la capacit & eacute; des employ & eacute;s & agrave; surveiller le comportement de l'entreprise, en particulier lorsque les filets de s & eacute;curit & eacute; sociale sont solides, que les revenus sont transparents, que les industries sont comp & eacute;titives et que les entreprises s'& eacute;cartent des normes de leurs pairs. L'inf & eacute;rence causale se confirme avec l'exploitation de l'adoption obligatoire des Normes Internationales d'Information Financi & egrave;re (International Financial Reporting Standards - IFRS) comme un choc exog & egrave;ne & agrave; la comparabilit & eacute;. Dans l'ensemble, nos r & eacute;sultats mettent en & eacute;vidence la comparabilit & eacute; comme un puissant m & eacute;canisme de gouvernance qui harmonise les incitations des entreprises et des employ & eacute;s dans les contrats d'emploi implicites, et apporte des orientations pratiques aux managers et aux d & eacute;cideurs politiques cherchant & agrave; renforcer la r & eacute;silience du march & eacute; du travail dans divers contextes institutionnels. En una econom & iacute;a global propensa a choques de demanda, las empresas dependen cada vez m & aacute;s de contratos impl & iacute;citos para estabilizar el empleo. Investigamos si la comparabilidad de los estados financieros fortalece estos contratos al permitir que los empleados comparen el desempe & ntilde;o de su empresa con el de sus pares, facilitando as & iacute; el reparto mutuo de riesgos. Utilizando datos a nivel empresarial de 44 pa & iacute;ses, encontramos que una mayor comparabilidad reduce los despidos durante las recesiones y modera las contrataciones agresivas durante los per & iacute;odos de auge, lo que es consistente con un ajuste laboral equilibrado bajo contratos impl & iacute;citos. Los empleados en empresas con alta comparabilidad tambi & eacute;n est & aacute;n m & aacute;s dispuestos a aceptar salarios m & aacute;s bajos sin comprometer la productividad, lo que refleja una mayor confianza y cooperaci & oacute;n. An & aacute;lisis adicionales sugieren que la comparabilidad mejora la capacidad de los empleados para monitorear el comportamiento de la empresa, particularmente cuando las redes de seguridad social son s & oacute;lidas, las utilidades son transparentes, las industrias son competitivas y las empresas se desv & iacute;an de las normas de sus pares. La utilizaci & oacute;n de la adopci & oacute;n obligatoria de las Normas Internacionales de Informaci & oacute;n Financiera (NIIF) como un choque ex & oacute;geno a la comparabilidad respalda la inferencia causal. En general, nuestros hallazgos destacan la comparabilidad como un poderoso mecanismo de gobernanza que alinea los incentivos entre empresas y empleados en contratos laborales impl & iacute;citos, y ofrece orientaci & oacute;n pr & aacute;ctica para gerentes y formuladores de pol & iacute;ticas que buscan fortalecer la resiliencia del mercado laboral en diversos contextos institucionales. Em uma economia global propensa a choques de demanda, empresas dependem cada vez mais de contratos impl & iacute;citos para estabilizar o emprego. Investigamos se a comparabilidade de demonstra & ccedil;& otilde;es financeiras fortalece esses contratos ao permitir que funcion & aacute;rios comparem o desempenho de sua empresa com o de seus pares, facilitando o compartilhamento m & uacute;tuo de riscos. Usando dados de empresas de 44 pa & iacute;ses, descobrimos que uma maior comparabilidade reduz demiss & otilde;es durante per & iacute;odos de recess & atilde;o e modera contrata & ccedil;& otilde;es agressivas durante per & iacute;odos de expans & atilde;o, consistentes com ajuste equilibrado da for & ccedil;a de trabalho sob contratos impl & iacute;citos. Funcion & aacute;rios de empresas com alta comparabilidade tamb & eacute;m est & atilde;o mais dispostos a aceitar sal & aacute;rios mais baixos sem comprometer a produtividade, refletindo maior confian & ccedil;a e coopera & ccedil;& atilde;o. An & aacute;lises adicionais sugerem que a comparabilidade melhora a capacidade dos funcion & aacute;rios de monitorar o comportamento da empresa, especialmente quando redes de prote & ccedil;& atilde;o social s & atilde;o fortes, lucros s & atilde;o transparentes, ind & uacute;strias s & atilde;o competitivas e empresas se desviam de normas de seus pares. A explora & ccedil;& atilde;o da ado & ccedil;& atilde;o obrigat & oacute;ria de Normas Internacionais de Relat & oacute;rio Financeiro (IFRS) como um choque ex & oacute;geno & agrave; comparabilidade apoia a infer & ecirc;ncia causal. No geral, nossas descobertas destacam a comparabilidade como um poderoso mecanismo de governan & ccedil;a que alinha incentivos entre empresas e funcion & aacute;rios em contratos de emprego impl & iacute;citos e oferece orienta & ccedil;& otilde;es pr & aacute;ticas para gestores e formuladores de pol & iacute;ticas que buscam fortalecer a resili & ecirc;ncia do mercado de trabalho em diversos contextos institucionais. 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