Bond market liberalization and corporate investment

• 成果类型: Article; Early Access
• 署名作者: Fu, Renhui; Gao, Fang; Wang, Yanhui; Zhang, Bohui
• 署名单位: Shanghai Jiao Tong University; Donghua University; Dongbei University of Finance & Economics; The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shenzhen
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2506
• DOI: 10.1057/s41267-026-00854-x
• 发表日期: 2026
• 关键词: Foreign investors; Debt maturity; AGENCY COSTS; RISK; governance; GROWTH; incentives; reputation; liquidity; QUALITY

摘要

Limited evidence exists on the real effects of bond market liberalization, particularly on corporate investment behavior. This study examines the impact of bond market liberalization on corporate investment, exploiting the 2017 launch of China's Bond Connect-which allows foreign investors to directly participate in the interbank bond market-as a quasi-natural experiment that increases firms' exposure to foreign debtholders. Using a difference-in-differences design, we find that bond market liberalization constrains corporate investment. Channel analyses reveal that this effect operates through tighter bond covenants, higher reputation costs, and increased litigation risk imposed by foreign bondholders. Consistent with a governance-based interpretation, the investment-reducing effect is more pronounced among firms with weaker governance structures, including fewer independent directors and less effective internal control systems. Importantly, the decline in investment is concentrated in overinvestment rather than value-enhancing projects, indicating that foreign bondholders discipline managerial empire-building without inducing excessive conservatism. Correspondingly, firms experience lower default risk, reduced credit spreads, and higher firm value following liberalization. Overall, our findings highlight the distinct, non-ownership-based governance role of foreign debtholders and suggest that bond market liberalization can foster efficiency and financial stability in emerging markets characterized by relatively weak domestic institutions. Il existe peu de preuves empiriques li & eacute;es aux impacts r & eacute;els de la lib & eacute;ralisation du march & eacute; obligataire, en particulier ceux sur le comportement d'investissement des entreprises. Cette recherche examine l'impact de la lib & eacute;ralisation du march & eacute; obligataire sur l'investissement des entreprises, en exploitant le lancement en 2017 du programme chinois Bond Connect, lequel permet aux investisseurs & eacute;trangers de participer directement au march & eacute; obligataire interbancaire, comme une exp & eacute;rience quasi-naturelle augmentant l'exposition des entreprises aux d & eacute;tenteurs de dettes & eacute;trangers. En utilisant une analyse des diff & eacute;rences de diff & eacute;rences, nous constatons que la lib & eacute;ralisation du march & eacute; obligataire freine l'investissement des entreprises. Les analyses des canaux r & eacute;v & egrave;lent que cet effet s'exerce par le biais de clauses obligataires plus strictes, de co & ucirc;ts de r & eacute;putation plus & eacute;lev & eacute;s et d'un risque accru de litiges, tous impos & eacute;s par les d & eacute;tenteurs de dettes & eacute;trangers. Conform & eacute;ment & agrave; une interpr & eacute;tation bas & eacute;e sur la gouvernance, l'effet de r & eacute;duction de l'investissement est plus prononc & eacute; parmi les entreprises ayant des structures de gouvernance plus faibles, y compris celles avec un nombre r & eacute;duit de directeurs ind & eacute;pendants et des syst & egrave;mes de contr & ocirc;le interne moins efficaces. Il est important de noter que le d & eacute;clin des investissements se concentre davantage sur les projets de surinvestissement que sur ceux cr & eacute;ateurs de valeur, ce qui indique que les d & eacute;tenteurs d'obligations & eacute;trang & egrave;res disciplinent la tendance des dirigeants & agrave; b & acirc;tir des empires sans pour autant induire un conservatisme excessif. En cons & eacute;quence, les entreprises connaissent un risque de d & eacute;faut plus faible, des & eacute;carts de cr & eacute;dit r & eacute;duits et une valeur globale plus & eacute;lev & eacute;e apr & egrave;s la lib & eacute;ralisation. Dans l'ensemble, nos r & eacute;sultats mettent en lumi & egrave;re le r & ocirc;le distinct, non fond & eacute; sur la propri & eacute;t & eacute;, des d & eacute;tenteurs de dette & eacute;trangers en mati & egrave;re de gouvernance, et sugg & egrave;rent que la lib & eacute;ralisation des march & eacute;s obligataires peut favoriser l'efficience et la stabilit & eacute; financi & egrave;re dans les march & eacute;s & eacute;mergents caract & eacute;ris & eacute;s par des institutions domestiques relativement faibles. Existe evidencia limitada sobre los efectos reales de la liberalizaci & oacute;n del mercado de bonos, particularmente en el comportamiento de la inversi & oacute;n corporativa. Este estudio examina el impacto de la liberalizaci & oacute;n del mercado de bonos en la inversi & oacute;n corporativa, aprovechando el lanzamiento en 2017 del Bond Connect de China (que permite a los inversionistas extranjeros participar directamente en el mercado interbancario de bonos), como un experimento cuasi-natural que incrementa la exposici & oacute;n de las empresas a los acreedores extranjeros. Utilizando un dise & ntilde;o de diferencias en diferencias, encontramos que la liberalizaci & oacute;n del mercado de bonos restringe la inversi & oacute;n corporativa. Los an & aacute;lisis de canales revelan que este efecto opera mediante de cl & aacute;usulas contractuales m & aacute;s estrictas en los bonos, mayores costos reputacionales y un aumento en el riesgo de litigios impuestos por los acreedores extranjeros. En l & iacute;nea con una interpretaci & oacute;n basada en la gobernanza, el efecto de reducci & oacute;n de la inversi & oacute;n es m & aacute;s pronunciado entre las empresas con estructuras de gobernanza m & aacute;s d & eacute;biles, incluyendo un menor n & uacute;mero de directores independientes y sistemas de control interno menos eficaces. Es importante destacar que la disminuci & oacute;n en la inversi & oacute;n se concentra en el sobreinversionismo,m & aacute;s que los proyectos que aumentan el valor, lo que indica que los acreedores extranjeros disciplinan la expansi & oacute;n gerencial excesiva sin inducir un conservadurismo excesivo. En consecuencia, las empresas experimentan un menor riesgo de incumplimiento, reducciones en los diferenciales de cr & eacute;dito y un mayor valor empresarial tras la liberalizaci & oacute;n. En general, nuestros hallazgos destacan el papel distintivo de gobernanza, no basado en la propiedad, de los acreedores extranjeros y sugieren que la liberalizaci & oacute;n del mercado de bonos puede fomentar la eficiencia y la estabilidad financiera en mercados emergentes caracterizados por instituciones nacionales relativamente d & eacute;biles. H & aacute; evid & ecirc;ncias limitadas sobre os efeitos reais da liberaliza & ccedil;& atilde;o do mercado de t & iacute;tulos, em particular no comportamento do investimento corporativo. Este estudo examina o impacto da liberaliza & ccedil;& atilde;o do mercado de t & iacute;tulos sobre o investimento corporativo, explorando o lan & ccedil;amento do Bond Connect, da China, em 2017 - que permite que investidores estrangeiros participem diretamente do mercado interbanc & aacute;rio de t & iacute;tulos - como um experimento quase natural que aumenta a exposi & ccedil;& atilde;o das empresas a credores estrangeiros. Utilizando um modelo de diferen & ccedil;a em diferen & ccedil;as, descobrimos que a liberaliza & ccedil;& atilde;o do mercado de t & iacute;tulos restringe o investimento corporativo. An & aacute;lises de canais revelam que esse efeito opera por meio de cl & aacute;usulas mais r & iacute;gidas nos contratos de t & iacute;tulos, custos reputacionais mais elevados e maior risco de lit & iacute;gios impostos por credores estrangeiros. Consistente com uma interpreta & ccedil;& atilde;o baseada em governan & ccedil;a, o efeito de redu & ccedil;& atilde;o do investimento & eacute; mais pronunciado entre empresas com estruturas de governan & ccedil;a mais fracas, incluindo menor n & uacute;mero de conselheiros independentes e sistemas de controle interno menos eficazes. & Eacute; not & aacute;vel que o decl & iacute;nio no investimento est & aacute; concentrado em projetos de sobreinvestimento, em vez de em projetos que aumentam o valor, o que indica que os credores estrangeiros disciplinam a tend & ecirc;ncia dos gestores de expandir excessivamente seus imp & eacute;rios, sem induzir um conservadorismo excessivo. De forma semelhante, as empresas experimentam menor risco de inadimplemento, spreads de cr & eacute;dito reduzidos e maior valor de mercado ap & oacute;s a liberaliza & ccedil;& atilde;o. De forma geral, nossos achados destacam o papel distinto de governan & ccedil;a, n & atilde;o baseado na propriedade, desempenhado pelos credores estrangeiros, e sugerem que a liberaliza & ccedil;& atilde;o do mercado de t & iacute;tulos pode promover efici & ecirc;ncia e estabilidade financeira em mercados emergentes caracterizados por institui & ccedil;& otilde;es dom & eacute;sticas relativamente fracas. 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