The uneven path to global value chain upgrading: regulations, private governance, and supplier compliance

• 成果类型: Article; Early Access
• 署名作者: Singh, Shubham; Gaur, Ajai; Mudambi, Ram
• 署名单位: Rutgers University System; Rutgers University Newark; Rutgers University System; Rutgers University Newark; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Temple University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2506
• DOI: 10.1057/s41267-026-00888-1
• 发表日期: 2026
• 关键词: human-resource management; strategies; pressures; STANDARDS; networks

摘要

Global value chains (GVCs) generate efficiency through production fragmentation but simultaneously create sustainability vulnerabilities that can undermine GVC resilience. While MNE buyer-led private ordering and state regulation represent the primary governance responses to these risks, their effects on supplier compliance remain contested. We develop a domain-sensitive governance framework showing that labor and environmental compliance differ systematically in their cost-benefit structures, and which in turn shape the effectiveness of governance forms in driving compliance across sustainability domains. Using a panel of over 2000 suppliers across emerging economies, we find evidence for the asymmetric effectiveness of governance forms across compliance domains. In the labor domain, both regulation and private ordering improve compliance, as stronger labor regulations increase MNE sourcing and reinforce suppliers' incentives to upgrade. In contrast, in the environmental domain, while private ordering improves compliance, stringent environmental regulation reduces MNE sourcing, weakening suppliers' incentives to invest in environmental improvements. We identify a buyer-regulation intermediation mechanism through which regulatory stringency shapes supplier compliance indirectly by altering MNE sourcing strategies. Our findings advance GVC governance research by showing that sustainability compliance, and thus resilience, depends not only on governance instruments but also on domain-specific incentive structures and buyer-mediated governance dynamics. Les cha & icirc;nes de valeur mondiales (CVM) g & eacute;n & egrave;rent de l'efficience gr & acirc;ce & agrave; la fragmentation de la production, mais cr & eacute;ent simultan & eacute;ment des vuln & eacute;rabilit & eacute;s en mati & egrave;re de durabilit & eacute; susceptibles de compromettre la r & eacute;silience des CVM. Bien que les ordonnances priv & eacute;es men & eacute;es par les entreprises multinationales (MNE) en tant qu'acheteurs et la r & eacute;gulation & eacute;tatique repr & eacute;sentent les principales r & eacute;ponses de gouvernance & agrave; ces risques, leurs impacts sur la conformit & eacute; des fournisseurs restent contest & eacute;s. Nous d & eacute;veloppons un cadre de gouvernance sensible aux domaines, qui montre que la conformit & eacute; en mati & egrave;re de travail et d'environnement pr & eacute;sente des diff & eacute;rences syst & eacute;matiques dans leurs structures de co & ucirc;ts et b & eacute;n & eacute;fices, ce qui, & agrave; son tour, fa & ccedil;onne l'efficacit & eacute; des formes de gouvernance pour promouvoir la conformit & eacute; dans les diff & eacute;rents domaines de la durabilit & eacute;. En utilisant un panel de plus de 2 000 fournisseurs dans des & eacute;conomies & eacute;mergentes, nous mettons en & eacute;vidence l'efficacit & eacute; asym & eacute;trique des formes de gouvernance selon les domaines de conformit & eacute;. Dans le domaine du travail, tant la r & eacute;glementation que l'ordonnance priv & eacute;e am & eacute;liorent la conformit & eacute;, car des r & eacute;glementations du travail plus strictes augmentent les approvisionnements des MNE, et renforcent les incitations des fournisseurs & agrave; se perfectionner. En revanche, dans le domaine environnemental, bien que l'ordonnance priv & eacute;e am & eacute;liore la conformit & eacute;, une r & eacute;glementation environnementale stricte r & eacute;duit les approvisionnements des MNE, affaiblissant ainsi les incitations des fournisseurs & agrave; investir dans des am & eacute;liorations environnementales. Nous identifions un m & eacute;canisme d'interm & eacute;diation entre acheteur et r & eacute;glementation, par lequel la rigueur r & eacute;glementaire fa & ccedil;onne indirectement la conformit & eacute; des fournisseurs en modifiant les strat & eacute;gies d'approvisionnement des MNE. Nos r & eacute;sultats font progresser la recherche sur la gouvernance des CVM en montrant que la conformit & eacute; en mati & egrave;re de durabilit & eacute;, et donc la r & eacute;silience, d & eacute;pend non seulement des instruments de gouvernance, mais aussi des structures d'incitation sp & eacute;cifiques & agrave; chaque domaine et des dynamiques de gouvernance m & eacute;di & eacute;es par les acheteurs. Las cadenas globales de valor (CGV) generan eficiencia mediante la fragmentaci & oacute;n de la producci & oacute;n, pero, simult & aacute;neamente, crean vulnerabilidades en materia de sostenibilidad que pueden socavar la resiliencia de las CGV. Aunque el ordenamiento privado liderado por compradores multinacionales (MNE, por sus siglas en ingl & eacute;s) y la regulaci & oacute;n estatal representan las principales respuestas de gobernanza a estos riesgos, sus efectos sobre el cumplimiento por parte de los proveedores siguen siendo objeto de debate. Desarrollamos un marco de gobernanza espec & iacute;fico seg & uacute;n el dominio que muestra que el cumplimiento en materia laboral y ambiental difiere sistem & aacute;ticamente en sus estructuras de costos y beneficios, lo que a su vez da forma a la efectividad de las formas de gobernanza para impulsar el cumplimiento en diferentes & aacute;mbitos de sostenibilidad. Utilizando un panel de m & aacute;s de 2.000 proveedores en econom & iacute;as emergentes, encontramos evidencia de la efectividad asim & eacute;trica de las formas de gobernanza en los distintos dominios de cumplimiento. En el & aacute;mbito laboral, tanto la regulaci & oacute;n como el orden privado mejoran el cumplimiento, ya que regulaciones laborales m & aacute;s estrictas aumentan el aprovisionamiento por parte de las multinacionales y refuerzan los incentivos de los proveedores para mejorar. En contraste, en el & aacute;mbito ambiental, aunque el orden privado mejora el cumplimiento, una regulaci & oacute;n ambiental estricta reduce el aprovisionamiento por parte de las multinacionales, debilitando los incentivos de los proveedores para invertir en mejoras ambientales. Identificamos un mecanismo de intermediaci & oacute;n comprador-regulaci & oacute;n a trav & eacute;s del cual la rigurosidad regulatoria influye indirectamente en el cumplimiento de los proveedores al alterar las estrategias de adquisici & oacute;n de las multinacionales. Nuestros hallazgos hacen avanzar la investigaci & oacute;n sobre la gobernanza de las cadenas globales de valor al demostrar que el cumplimiento en sostenibilidad, y por ende la resiliencia, depende no solo de los instrumentos de gobernanza, sino tambi & eacute;n de las estructuras de incentivos espec & iacute;ficas de cada dominio y de las din & aacute;micas de gobernanza mediadas por los compradores. Cadeias globais de valor (GVCs) geram efici & ecirc;ncia por meio da fragmenta & ccedil;& atilde;o da produ & ccedil;& atilde;o, mas, simultaneamente, criam vulnerabilidades de sustentabilidade que podem comprometer a resili & ecirc;ncia dessas cadeias. Embora encomendas privadas oriundas de compradores de MNEs e a regula & ccedil;& atilde;o estatal representem as principais respostas de governan & ccedil;a a esses riscos, seus efeitos sobre a conformidade dos fornecedores permanecem controversos. Desenvolvemos um modelo de governan & ccedil;a sens & iacute;vel ao dom & iacute;nio, mostrando que a conformidade trabalhista e ambiental difere sistematicamente em suas estruturas de custo-benef & iacute;cio, o que, por sua vez, molda a efic & aacute;cia das formas de governan & ccedil;a na promo & ccedil;& atilde;o da conformidade em diferentes dom & iacute;nios de sustentabilidade. Utilizando um painel com mais de 2.000 fornecedores em economias emergentes, encontramos evid & ecirc;ncias da efic & aacute;cia assim & eacute;trica das formas de governan & ccedil;a nos diferentes dom & iacute;nios de conformidade. No dom & iacute;nio trabalhista, tanto a regulamenta & ccedil;& atilde;o quanto as encomendas privadas melhoram a conformidade, uma vez que regulamenta & ccedil;& otilde;es trabalhistas mais rigorosas aumentam o fornecimento por parte de MNEs e refor & ccedil;am os incentivos dos fornecedores a se aprimorarem. Em contraste, no dom & iacute;nio ambiental, embora encomendas privadas melhorem a conformidade, regulamenta & ccedil;& otilde;es ambientais rigorosas reduzem o fornecimento por parte de MNEs, enfraquecendo os incentivos para os fornecedores investirem em melhorias ambientais. Identificamos um mecanismo de intermedia & ccedil;& atilde;o comprador-regula & ccedil;& atilde;o, por meio do qual a rigidez regulat & oacute;ria molda indiretamente a conformidade dos fornecedores ao alterar as estrat & eacute;gias de fornecimento das MNEs. Nossas descobertas avan & ccedil;am a pesquisa sobre governan & ccedil;a em GVCs ao mostrar que a conformidade com a sustentabilidade e, consequentemente, a resili & ecirc;ncia dependem n & atilde;o apenas dos instrumentos de governan & ccedil;a, mas tamb & eacute;m das estruturas de incentivos espec & iacute;ficas de cada dom & iacute;nio e das din & acirc;micas de governan & ccedil;a mediadas pelos compradores. (sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic) (GVCs) (sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic), (sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic), (sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)GVC(sic)(sic)(sic).(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic) (MNE) (sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic), (sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic).(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic), (sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic), (sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic).(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)2000(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic), (sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic).(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic), (sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic), (sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)MNE(sic)(sic)(sic), (sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic).(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic), (sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic), (sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic), (sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)MNE(sic)(sic)(sic), (sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic).(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)--(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic), (sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)MNE(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic), (sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic).(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)GVC(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic), (sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)--(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)--(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic), (sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic).