Populism, regime characteristics, and MNC location choice

• 成果类型: Article; Early Access
• 署名作者: Jandhyala, Srividya; Kunczer, Vera; Lindner, Thomas
• 署名单位: ESSEC Business School; Copenhagen Business School; University of Innsbruck
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2506
• DOI: 10.1057/s41267-026-00878-3
• 发表日期: 2026
• 关键词: POLITICAL AFFINITY; institutions; legitimacy; RISK

摘要

Countries with populist governments are less attractive investment destinations for Multinational Corporations (MNCs), as foreign firms tend to be delegitimized and targeted as members of the outgroup. However, populist governments vary in the extent to which they delegitimize foreign firms as outsiders. Departing from the traditional right-left classification that masks key differences among political regimes, this paper investigates aspects central to populism and to how populist governments see foreign firms: business orientation and stance on immigration. Pro-business regimes perceive a greater role for private sector firms and are less likely to treat MNCs as members of the outgroup. However, regimes with a strong anti-immigration stance highlight threats to local identity and are more likely to treat MNCs as members of the outgroup. Using a dataset of over 23,000 foreign direct investments (FDI) across 61 host countries from 2008 to 2017, we find that the adverse effect of populism on FDI is diminished in pro-business regimes whereas it is amplified in regimes with strong anti-immigration stances. Furthermore, regime alignment between home and host countries reduces the negative impact of populist governments on FDI. Our research highlights the crucial role of regime characteristics in shaping FDI across populist governments. Les d & eacute;bats de longue date persistent quant & agrave; l'impact des nouvelles technologies sur les entreprises, en particulier en ce qui concerne l'internationalisation. Certains chercheurs sugg & egrave;rent que la num & eacute;risation renforcera les avantages des activit & eacute;s d'exportation en facilitant les connexions avec les partenaires et les clients. D'autres, en revanche, estiment que la num & eacute;risation ne sera tout simplement pas & agrave; la hauteur des attentes, voire qu'elle aura des cons & eacute;quences encore plus n & eacute;fastes. Ce d & eacute;bat est particuli & egrave;rement pertinent pour les PME, & eacute;tant donn & eacute; que l'activit & eacute; d'exportation constitue pour elles la principale voie d'acc & egrave;s aux march & eacute;s mondiaux. Nous proposons que la num & eacute;risation exercera des effets doubles sur les PME : d'un c & ocirc;t & eacute; & laquo; lumineux & raquo;, des investissements plus importants dans les technologies num & eacute;riques conduiront & agrave; une activit & eacute; d'exportation accrue (c'est-& agrave;-dire des ventes & agrave; l'exportation plus & eacute;lev & eacute;es) ; d'un c & ocirc;t & eacute; & laquo; sombre & raquo;, cependant, l'activit & eacute; d'exportation induite par la num & eacute;risation g & eacute;n & eacute;rera moins d'opportunit & eacute;s d'apprentissage aupr & egrave;s des partenaires d'exportation (c'est-& agrave;-dire des gains de productivit & eacute; plus faibles). Les hypoth & egrave;ses propos & eacute;es ont & eacute;t & eacute; test & eacute;es et confirm & eacute;es & agrave; l'aide de donn & eacute;es d & eacute;taill & eacute;es au niveau de l'entreprise, issues d'un panel de 20133 entreprises portugaises entre 2010 et 2019. Des analyses suppl & eacute;mentaires et des & eacute;tudes de cas corroborent les m & eacute;canismes propos & eacute;s, et sugg & egrave;rent des approches hybrides comme une solution possible pour & eacute;quilibrer ces effets doubles de la num & eacute;risation. Ensemble, ces r & eacute;sultats apportent un & eacute;clairage nouveau sur le d & eacute;bat concernant le r & ocirc;le de la num & eacute;risation dans les efforts d'internationalisation. Los pa & iacute;ses con gobiernos populistas son destinos de inversi & oacute;n menos atractivos para las multinacionales, ya que las empresas extranjeras tienden a ser deslegitimadas y tratadas como actores externos. Sin embargo, los gobiernos populistas var & iacute;an en la medida en que deslegitiman a las empresas extranjeras como forasteras. Alej & aacute;ndose de la clasificaci & oacute;n tradicional de derecha-izquierda que oculta diferencias clave entre los reg & iacute;menes pol & iacute;ticos, este art & iacute;culo investiga aspectos centrales del populismo y c & oacute;mo los gobiernos populistas perciben a las empresas extranjeras: la orientaci & oacute;n proempresarial y la postura sobre la inmigraci & oacute;n. Los reg & iacute;menes proempresariales perciben un mayor papel para las empresas del sector privado y tienen menos probabilidades de tratar a las multinacionales como actores externos. Sin embargo, los reg & iacute;menes con una postura restrictiva frente a la inmigraci & oacute;n destacan las amenazas a la identidad local y tienen m & aacute;s probabilidades de tratar a las multinacionales como actores externos. Utilizando una base de datos de m & aacute;s de 23,000 inversiones extranjeras directas (IED) en 61 pa & iacute;ses anfitriones entre 2008 y 2017, encontramos que el efecto adverso del populismo sobre la IED se reduce en los reg & iacute;menes proempresariales. Adem & aacute;s, el efecto adverso del populismo se amplifica en los reg & iacute;menes con posturas fuertemente antiinmigraci & oacute;n, mientras que la alineaci & oacute;n entre los reg & iacute;menes del pa & iacute;s de origen y el pa & iacute;s anfitri & oacute;n disminuye el impacto negativo de los gobiernos populistas sobre la IED. Nuestra investigaci & oacute;n destaca el papel crucial de las caracter & iacute;sticas del r & eacute;gimen en la configuraci & oacute;n de la IED en contextos de gobiernos populistas. Pa & iacute;ses com governos populistas s & atilde;o destinos de investimento menos atrativos para MNCs, pois empresas estrangeiras tendem a ser deslegitimadas e alvo de ataques por serem vistas como integrantes de um grupo externo. No entanto, governos populistas variam no grau em que deslegitimam empresas estrangeiras como forasteiras. Partindo da classifica & ccedil;& atilde;o tradicional entre direita e esquerda, que oculta diferen & ccedil;as importantes entre regimes pol & iacute;ticos, este artigo investiga aspectos centrais do populismo e como governos populistas enxergam empresas estrangeiras: orienta & ccedil;& atilde;o pr & oacute;-neg & oacute;cios e posi & ccedil;& atilde;o em rela & ccedil;& atilde;o & agrave; imigra & ccedil;& atilde;o. Regimes favor & aacute;veis ao neg & oacute;cio reconhecem um papel maior das empresas do setor privado e s & atilde;o menos propensos a tratar MNCs como membros de um grupo externo. No entanto, regimes com uma postura fortemente anti-imigra & ccedil;& atilde;o destacam amea & ccedil;as & agrave; identidade local e s & atilde;o mais propensos a tratar MNCs como membros de um grupo externo. Utilizando um conjunto de dados com mais de 23.000 investimentos estrangeiros diretos (FDI) em 61 pa & iacute;ses anfitri & otilde;es entre 2008 e 2017, descobrimos que o efeito adverso do populismo sobre FDI & eacute; reduzido em regimes favor & aacute;veis a neg & oacute;cios. Al & eacute;m disso, o efeito adverso do populismo & eacute; amplificado em regimes com posturas fortemente anti-imigra & ccedil;& atilde;o, enquanto o alinhamento entre os regimes dos pa & iacute;ses de origem e de destino reduz o impacto negativo de governos populistas sobre o FDI. Nossa pesquisa destaca o papel crucial das caracter & iacute;sticas dos regimes na configura & ccedil;& atilde;o dos fluxos de FDI sob governos populistas. 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