Violent conflicts, institutional friction, and foreign divestment: the case of MNCs' market exit from Russia

• 成果类型: Article; Early Access
• 署名作者: Holtbrugge, Dirk; Oberhauser, Marc; Kirste, Laura
• 署名单位: University of Erlangen Nuremberg; heSam Universite; ESCP Business School
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2506
• DOI: 10.1057/s41267-026-00892-5
• 发表日期: 2026
• 关键词: COUNTRY INSTITUTIONS; distance; Embeddedness; SUBSIDIARY; legitimacy; SANCTIONS; IMPACT; entry

摘要

Geopolitical conflicts can abruptly and significantly change the institutional conditions of multinational corporations (MNCs). Yet, the impact of such institutional friction on foreign divestment is not yet well understood. While prior research has conceptualized institutional friction as a dynamic alternative to static measures of institutional distance, its implications for firm behavior remain underexplored. We develop and test a model of institutional friction that captures how structural (political affinity), situational (military threat and regulatory responses), and operational (institutional embeddedness) friction jointly influence foreign divestment decisions, using the case of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Based on data from 864 MNCs operating in Russia, we find that institutional friction arising from political affinity and military threat, combined with firms' institutional embeddedness, significantly affects exit decisions. In contrast, economic sanctions imposed by Western countries have no direct effect on MNCs' exit decisions but become consequential through their interaction with other dimensions of institutional friction, amplifying the effects of political affinity and military threat. These findings advance international business research by providing a structured and empirically grounded framework for analyzing how geopolitical conflicts affect strategic responses of MNCs. Specifically, we demonstrate how structural, situational, and operational frictions shape MNCs' market exit decisions. Les conflits g & eacute;opolitiques peuvent modifier brusquement et consid & eacute;rablement les conditions institutionnelles des entreprises multinationales (MNEs). Cependant, n'est pas encore bien compris l'impact de ces frictions institutionnelles sur les d & eacute;sinvestissements & agrave; l'& eacute;tranger. Alors que les recherches ant & eacute;rieures ont conceptualis & eacute; la friction institutionnelle comme une alternative dynamique aux mesures statiques de la distance institutionnelle, ses implications pour le comportement des entreprises demeurent peu explor & eacute;es. Nous d & eacute;veloppons et testons un mod & egrave;le de friction institutionnelle qui retrace comment les frictions structurelles (affinit & eacute; politique), situationnelles (menace militaire et r & eacute;ponses r & eacute;glementaires) et op & eacute;rationnelles (encastrement institutionnel) influencent conjointement les d & eacute;cisions de d & eacute;sinvestissement & agrave; l'& eacute;tranger, et ce en nous appuyant sur le cas de l'invasion de l'Ukraine par la Russie. Sur la base de donn & eacute;es relatives & agrave; 864 MNEs op & eacute;rant en Russie, nous constatons que les frictions institutionnelles d & eacute;coulant de l'affinit & eacute; politique et de la menace militaire, combin & eacute;es & agrave; l'encastrement institutionnel des entreprises, influencent de mani & egrave;re significative les d & eacute;cisions de retrait. En revanche, les sanctions & eacute;conomiques impos & eacute;es par les pays occidentaux n'ont pas d'effet direct sur les d & eacute;cisions de sortie des MNEs, mais deviennent cons & eacute;quentes & agrave; travers leur interaction avec d'autres dimensions de la friction institutionnelle, amplifiant les effets de l'affinit & eacute; politique et de la menace militaire. Ces r & eacute;sultats font progresser la recherche en affaires internationales en proposant un cadre structur & eacute; et empiriquement fond & eacute; pour analyser comment les conflits g & eacute;opolitiques influencent les r & eacute;ponses strat & eacute;giques des MNEs. Plus pr & eacute;cis & eacute;ment, nous d & eacute;montrons comment les frictions structurelles, situationnelles et op & eacute;rationnelles fa & ccedil;onnent les d & eacute;cisions de sortie des march & eacute;s des MNEs. Los conflictos geopol & iacute;ticos pueden cambiar de manera abrupta y significativa las condiciones institucionales de las corporaciones multinacionales (MNCs por sus iniciales en ingl & eacute;s). Sin embargo, el impacto de dicha fricci & oacute;n institucional en las desinversiones extranjeras a & uacute;n no se comprende completamente. Aunque investigaciones previas han conceptualizado la fricci & oacute;n institucional como una alternativa din & aacute;mica frente las medidas est & aacute;ticas de distancia institucional, sus implicaciones para el comportamiento de las empresas siguen siendo poco exploradas. Desarrollamos y pusimos a prueba emp & iacute;rica un modelo de fricci & oacute;n institucional que da cuenta de c & oacute;mo la fricci & oacute;n estructural (afinidad pol & iacute;tica), situacional (amenaza militar y respuestas regulatorias) y operativa (arraigo institucional) influyen conjuntamente en las decisiones de desinversi & oacute;n extranjera, utilizando el caso de la invasi & oacute;n rusa a Ucrania. Con base en datos de 864 corporaciones multinacionales que operan en Rusia, encontramos que la fricci & oacute;n institucional derivada de la afinidad pol & iacute;tica y la amenaza militar, combinada con el arraigo institucional de las empresas, afecta significativamente las decisiones de salida del mercado. En contraste, las sanciones econ & oacute;micas impuestas por los pa & iacute;ses occidentales no tienen un efecto directo en las decisiones de salida de las corporaciones multinacionales, pero adquieren relevancia a trav & eacute;s de su interacci & oacute;n con otras dimensiones de la fricci & oacute;n institucional, amplificando los efectos de la afinidad pol & iacute;tica y la amenaza militar. Estos hallazgos contribuyen al avance de la investigaci & oacute;n en negocios internacionales al proporcionar un marco estructurado y emp & iacute;ricamente fundamentado para analizar c & oacute;mo los conflictos geopol & iacute;ticos afectan las respuestas estrat & eacute;gicas de las corporaciones multinacionales. Espec & iacute;ficamente, demostramos c & oacute;mo las fricciones estructurales, situacionales y operativas moldean las decisiones de salida del mercado de las corporaciones multinacionales. Conflitos geopol & iacute;ticos podem alterar, de forma abrupta e significativa, as condi & ccedil;& otilde;es institucionais das corpora & ccedil;& otilde;es multinacionais (MNCs). No entanto, o impacto desse atrito institucional sobre o desinvestimento estrangeiro ainda n & atilde;o & eacute; bem compreendido. Embora pesquisas anteriores tenham conceituado o atrito institucional como uma alternativa din & acirc;mica & agrave;s medidas est & aacute;ticas de dist & acirc;ncia institucional, suas implica & ccedil;& otilde;es para o comportamento da firma permanecem pouco exploradas. Desenvolvemos e testamos um modelo de atrito institucional que captura como atritos estruturais (afinidade pol & iacute;tica), situacionais (amea & ccedil;a militar e respostas regulat & oacute;rias) e operacionais (enraizamento institucional) influenciam conjuntamente decis & otilde;es de desinvestimento estrangeiro, com base no caso da invas & atilde;o da Ucr & acirc;nia pela R & uacute;ssia. Com base em dados de 864 MNCs com opera & ccedil;& otilde;es na R & uacute;ssia, descobrimos que o atrito institucional decorrente da afinidade pol & iacute;tica e da amea & ccedil;a militar, combinado com o enraizamento institucional das empresas, afeta significativamente decis & otilde;es de sa & iacute;da. Em contraste, san & ccedil;& otilde;es econ & ocirc;micas impostas por pa & iacute;ses do Ocidente n & atilde;o t & ecirc;m efeito direto sobre as decis & otilde;es de sa & iacute;da de MNCs, mas tornam-se relevantes por meio de sua intera & ccedil;& atilde;o com outras dimens & otilde;es do atrito institucional, ampliando os efeitos da afinidade pol & iacute;tica e da amea & ccedil;a militar. Essas descobertas avan & ccedil;am a pesquisa em neg & oacute;cios internacionais ao fornecer um modelo estruturado e empiricamente fundamentado para analisar como conflitos geopol & iacute;ticos afetam as respostas estrat & eacute;gicas das MNCs. Especificamente, demonstramos como atritos estruturais, situacionais e operacionais moldam decis & otilde;es de sa & iacute;da de mercado de MNCs. 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