Cross-border effects of US FCPA enforcement: information and institutional spillovers in China through industry peers

• 成果类型: Article; Early Access
• 署名作者: Huang, Haijie; Kim, Jeong-Bon; Lee, Edward; Zhang, Junsheng
• 署名单位: East China Normal University; Simon Fraser University; University of Manchester; Alliance Manchester Business School; Sun Yat Sen University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2506
• DOI: 10.1057/s41267-026-00845-y
• 发表日期: 2026
• 关键词: CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT; political connections; foreign; INVESTMENT; disclosure; contagion; GROWTH; CHOICE; FIRMS

摘要

We examine whether and how the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) drives intra-industry information spillovers that propagate cross-border institutional spillovers in China. Regulatory disclosures of FCPA enforcement actions against US firms can influence non-violating Chinese firms in the same industry through either (1) contagion risk arising from increased anti-corruption scrutiny in China or (2) competitive advantage due to reduced competition from US counterparts. Consistent with the contagion risk (competitive advantage) effect, we provide evidence over the 2011-2023 sample period that Securities and Exchange Commission disclosures of China-related (non-China-related) FCPA violations by US peer firms generate valuation discounts (premiums) among non-violating Chinese focal firms that are more likely to be suspected of corruption. Further analyses reveal subsequent decreases (increases) in profitability and suspected corruption spending among these Chinese firms. Our findings suggest that FCPA-related regulatory disclosures play an information subsidy role given the lack of transparency regarding corruption activities and serve as a form of institutional subsidy that promotes monitoring against such practices in weaker regulatory environments. While the pros and cons of the FCPA for US firms remain debatable, our study implies that international coordination and collaboration in anti-corruption enforcement should be strengthened to curb bribery in international business. On February 10, 2025, US President Donald J. Trump signed an executive order suspending the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), a law enacted in 1977 to prevent US firms from bribing foreign officials. The FCPA has been controversial, with supporters claiming it upholds US moral leadership against corruption, while critics argue it disadvantages US firms abroad. This study examines how US regulatory disclosures of FCPA enforcement actions affect Chinese firms, focusing on intra-industry information spillovers and cross-border institutional spillovers. The research is significant because China has the highest number of FCPA violations by US firms and a weaker institutional framework where corporate corruption is common.This article uses an event-study methodology to analyze how investors of Chinese firms respond to US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) disclosures of FCPA violations by US firms. The study focuses on non-violating Chinese firms in the same industry as the violating US firms. The researchers examine whether these disclosures serve as an information subsidy for investors concerned about corruption but facing high information costs. They also explore whether these disclosures act as an institutional subsidy, enhancing scrutiny and monitoring in countries with weaker regulatory environments like China. The study considers two effects: the contagion risk effect, where news about a peer firm affects a focal firm negatively, and the competitive advantage effect, where the news benefits the focal firm by weakening a competitor.The study finds that when US firms are penalized for bribery in China, non-violating Chinese firms in the same industry experience a valuation discount, consistent with the contagion risk effect. This effect is stronger for firms suspected of corruption. Conversely, when US firms are penalized for bribery outside China, Chinese firms experience a valuation premium, consistent with the competitive advantage effect. The findings suggest that US FCPA disclosures create information spillovers that influence firm valuations and corporate behavior in China. The study contributes to the literature on corporate corruption and information disclosure by showing how regulatory actions in one country can affect firms in another. The suspension of the FCPA could weaken global anti-corruption efforts and increase information costs for investors. Future implications include the need for greater international regulatory collaboration to combat corporate corruption effectively.This text was initially drafted using artificial intelligence, then reviewed by the author(s) to ensure accuracy. Nous examinons si et comment la loi am & eacute;ricaine sur les pratiques de corruption & agrave; l'& eacute;tranger (Foreign Corrupt Practices Act - FCPA) favorise des effets de d & eacute;bordement d'information intra-sectorielle qui propagent des retomb & eacute;es institutionnelles transfrontali & egrave;res en Chine. Les divulgations r & eacute;glementaires des mesures d'application de la FCPA & agrave; l'encontre des entreprises am & eacute;ricaines peuvent influencer les entreprises chinoises non contrevenantes dans le m & ecirc;me secteur, soit (1) par un risque de contagion r & eacute;sultant d'une surveillance accrue de la lutte contre la corruption en Chine, soit (2) par l'avantage concurrentiel d & eacute;coulant d'une concurrence r & eacute;duite de la part de leurs homologues am & eacute;ricains. Conform & eacute;ment & agrave; l'effet de risque de contagion (avantage concurrentiel), nous d & eacute;montrons sur la p & eacute;riode 2011-2023 que les divulgations de l'Autorit & eacute; des March & eacute;s Financiers (Securities and Exchange Commission - SEC) concernant des violations de la FCPA li & eacute;es & agrave; la Chine (ou non li & eacute;es & agrave; la Chine) par des entreprises homologues am & eacute;ricaines g & eacute;n & egrave;rent des d & eacute;cotes (ou des primes) de valorisation parmi les entreprises focales chinoises qui n'ont pas commis de violation, mais qui sont plus susceptibles d'& ecirc;tre soup & ccedil;onn & eacute;es de corruption. Des analyses plus approfondies r & eacute;v & egrave;lent des baisses (ou augmentations) ult & eacute;rieures de la rentabilit & eacute; et des d & eacute;penses suspect & eacute;es li & eacute;es & agrave; la corruption parmi ces entreprises chinoises. Nos r & eacute;sultats sugg & egrave;rent que les divulgations r & eacute;glementaires li & eacute;es & agrave; la FCPA jouent un r & ocirc;le de subvention informationnelle, compte tenu du manque de transparence concernant les activit & eacute;s de corruption, et servent de forme de subvention institutionnelle qui favorise la surveillance contre de telles pratiques dans des environnements r & eacute;glementaires plus faibles. Bien que les avantages et les inconv & eacute;nients de la FCPA pour les entreprises am & eacute;ricaines restent discutables, notre recherche implique que la coordination et la collaboration internationales dans l'application des lois anti-corruption devraient & ecirc;tre renforc & eacute;es pour lutter contre la corruption dans les affaires internationales. Examinamos si y c & oacute;mo la Ley de Pr & aacute;cticas Corruptas en el Extranjero de los Estados Unidos (FCPA, por sus siglas en ingl & eacute;s) impulsa derrames de informaci & oacute;n intraindustriales que propagan efectos institucionales transfronterizos en China. Las divulgaciones regulatorias de acciones sancionatorias de la FCPA contra empresas estadounidenses pueden influir en empresas chinas no infractoras dentro de la misma industria a trav & eacute;s de (1) el riesgo de contagio derivado de un mayor escrutinio anticorrupci & oacute;n en China o (2) una ventaja competitiva debido a la reducci & oacute;n de la competencia por parte de sus pares estadounidenses. De manera consistente con el efecto de riesgo de contagio (ventaja competitiva), proporcionamos evidencia para el per & iacute;odo de muestra 2011-2023 de que las divulgaciones de la Comisi & oacute;n de Bolsa y Valores (SEC, por sus siglas en ingl & eacute;s) sobre violaciones de la FCPA relacionadas con China (no relacionadas con China) por parte de empresas pares estadounidenses generan descuentos (primas) en la valoraci & oacute;n de las empresas focales chinas no infractoras que tienen m & aacute;s probabilidades de ser sospechosas de corrupci & oacute;n. An & aacute;lisis adicionales revelan disminuciones (aumentos) posteriores en la rentabilidad y en los gastos presuntamente vinculados acorrupci & oacute;n entre estas empresas chinas. Nuestros hallazgos sugieren que las divulgaciones regulatorias relacionadas con la FCPA desempe & ntilde;an un papel de subsidio informativo, dada la falta de transparencia respecto a las actividades corruptas, y sirven como una forma de subsidio institucional que fomenta la supervisi & oacute;n contra dichas pr & aacute;cticas en entornos regulatorios m & aacute;s d & eacute;biles. Aunque las ventajas y desventajas de la FCPA para las empresas estadounidenses siguen siendo objeto de debate, nuestro estudio sugiere que la coordinaci & oacute;n y colaboraci & oacute;n internacional en la aplicaci & oacute;n de medidas anticorrupci & oacute;n deben fortalecerse para frenar el soborno en los negocios internacionales. Examinamos se e como a Lei de Pr & aacute;ticas Corruptas Estrangeiras (Foreign Corrupt Practices Act - FCPA) dos EUA impulsiona o extravaso intraind & uacute;stria de informa & ccedil;& otilde;es que propaga efeitos institucionais transfronteiri & ccedil;os na China. Comunicados regulat & oacute;rios sobre a & ccedil;& otilde;es de aplica & ccedil;& atilde;o do FCPA contra empresas americanas podem influenciar empresas chinesas n & atilde;o infratoras no mesmo setor por meio de (1) risco de cont & aacute;gio decorrente do aumento da fiscaliza & ccedil;& atilde;o anticorrup & ccedil;& atilde;o na China ou (2) vantagem competitiva devido & agrave; redu & ccedil;& atilde;o da concorr & ecirc;ncia por parte de empresas americanas. Consistente com o efeito de risco de cont & aacute;gio (vantagem competitiva), fornecemos evid & ecirc;ncias, no per & iacute;odo da amostra de 2011-2023, de que divulga & ccedil;& otilde;es da Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) sobre viola & ccedil;& otilde;es do FCPA relacionadas & agrave; China (ou n & atilde;o relacionadas & agrave; China) por empresas americanas do mesmo setor geram descontos (pr & ecirc;mios) de avalia & ccedil;& atilde;o entre empresas chinesas n & atilde;o infratoras que s & atilde;o mais propensas a serem suspeitas de corrup & ccedil;& atilde;o. An & aacute;lises adicionais revelam subsequentes redu & ccedil;& otilde;es (aumentos) na lucratividade e em gastos de suspeita de corrup & ccedil;& atilde;o entre essas empresas chinesas. Nossas descobertas sugerem que divulga & ccedil;& otilde;es regulat & oacute;rias relacionadas ao FCPA desempenham um papel de subs & iacute;dio informacional, dada a falta de transpar & ecirc;ncia em rela & ccedil;& atilde;o a atividades de corrup & ccedil;& atilde;o, e servem como uma forma de subs & iacute;dio institucional que promove a fiscaliza & ccedil;& atilde;o contra tais pr & aacute;ticas em ambientes regulat & oacute;rios mais fracos. Embora os pr & oacute;s e contras do FCPA para empresas americanas permane & ccedil;am debat & iacute;veis, nosso estudo sugere que a coordena & ccedil;& atilde;o e a colabora & ccedil;& atilde;o internacional na aplica & ccedil;& atilde;o de medidas anticorrup & ccedil;& atilde;o devam ser fortalecidas para conter o suborno em neg & oacute;cios internacionais. 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