CEO Succession Under Anticipatory Awareness Misalignment

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Camuffo, Arnaldo; Espinosa, Miguel; Gambardella, Alfonso; Pignataro, Andrea
• 署名单位: Bocconi University; Bocconi University; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut
• 刊物名称: ORGANIZATION SCIENCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1047-7039
• DOI: 10.1287/orsc.2025.20384
• 发表日期: 2026
• 关键词: firm performance; MODEL; CONTRACTS; dismissal; impacts; CHOICE

摘要

We develop a dynamic model of chief executive officer (CEO) succession under anticipatory awareness misalignment: the divergence between the board's and the CEO's private beliefs about the firm's strategic potential. The CEO chooses unobservable effort, may send costly noncontractible signals, and faces interim termination based on performance thresholds. We derive closed-form expressions for optimal CEO incentive intensity, effort, and fixed pay and show how they are influenced by belief misalignment, CEO capability, and market frictions. We present propositions that explain how belief alignment affects effort and pay, how misaligned types are separated through signaling, and how misalignment impacts firing thresholds and the matching of boards and CEO. We show that misalignment reduces incentive efficiency, increases fixed pay, and increases the probability of early dismissal. CEOs aligned with the board receive higher variable compensation; misaligned types must compensate with signals or accept weaker incentives. The model generates empirically testable predictions on compensation structure, retention, and succession outcomes.