Decentralized Autonomous Organization Governance

• 成果类型: Article; Early Access
• 署名作者: Han, Jungsuk; Lee, Jongsub; Li, Tao
• 署名单位: Seoul National University (SNU); State University System of Florida; University of Florida; European Corporate Governance Institute
• 刊物名称: MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0025-1909
• DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2024.07033
• 发表日期: 2026
• 关键词: DAO; decentralized finance; governance; Blockchain; whales; incentive conflicts; Strategic trading; token liquidity; network effects

摘要

Decentralized autonomous organizations (DAOs) are entities without central leadership and operate based on a set of decision-making rules encoded into smart contracts using blockchain technology. In this study, we develop a theoretical model of DAO governance featuring strategic token trading under token-based voting to investigate potential conflicts of interest between a large participant (a whale) and many small participants. Our results show that ownership concentration has a negative effect on platform growth, but platform size, token illiquidity, and long-term incentives can mitigate this negative effect. We confirm these predictions using novel voting data on major DAOs from 2020 and 2024.