Multidimensional Signaling with Supplier Credit Guarantees

• 成果类型: Article; Early Access
• 署名作者: Liu, Huihui; Song, Haotian; Xiao, Wenqiang
• 署名单位: Beihang University; Zhejiang University; New York University
• 刊物名称: MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0025-1909
• DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2024.07052
• 发表日期: 2026
• 关键词: supply chain finance; credit guarantee; information asymmetry; Multidimensional signaling

摘要

This paper investigates credit guarantees in a supply chain setting involving a supplier, a capital-constrained buyer, and a bank. We find that under complete information, credit guarantees increase order quantities but paradoxically raise wholesale prices, overall rendering the credit guarantee not useful for improving the operational efficiency. However, under information asymmetry, either a partial or full guarantee emerges in equilibrium, with the wholesale price maintained at its optimal full-information level. This underscores the pivotal role of credit guarantees in effective signaling and delineates the distinct functions of the wholesale price and the guarantee-the former on operational efficiency and the latter on signaling efficacy. Further comparative analysis of the supplier and buyer performances under the two contract types reveals that credit guarantees do not always benefit both parties.