Waiting for the Right Offer: Laboratory Evidence on How News Affects Bargaining

• 成果类型: Article; Early Access
• 署名作者: Ding, Tingting; Lehrer, Steven F.
• 署名单位: James Madison University; Shanghai University of Finance & Economics; Queens University - Canada; National Bureau of Economic Research
• 刊物名称: MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0025-1909
• DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2024.07224
• 发表日期: 2026
• 关键词: Dynamic bargaining; adverse selection; Information revelation; inequality aversion; laboratory experiments

摘要

We conduct a series of laboratory experiments to examine whether the gradual exogenous revelation of sellers' private information influences the occurrence of trades in a bilateral bargaining setting with a static lemon condition. We find that, although information does not increase efficiency, it reduces the likelihood that buyers incur losses when trading with low-quality sellers. Anticipating that additional signals will arrive, buyers hesitate to finalize deals immediately and exhibit a waiting for news effect, making sizable offer adjustments only when sufficient positive signals have accumulated. In contrast, informed sellers are less sensitive to news but appear to wait for the offer that they deem acceptable.