Government Deleveraging and the Reverse Crowding-In Effect: Evidence from Subnational Debt and Government Contractors

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Hu, Tiayin; Liu, Songrui; Yao, Yang; Zong, Zhu
• 署名单位: Peking University; Peking University; Peking University; Renmin University of China
• 刊物名称: MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0025-1909
• DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2024.05679
• 发表日期: 2026
• 关键词: Deleveraging; subnational debt; Government procurement; Trade credit; shadow banking; credit misallocation

摘要

We document a novel trade-credit channel through which government deleveraging affects the private economy. Our empirical analysis exploits China's 2017 deleveraging campaign that reduced local governments' net financing capacity and a purpose-built data set of listed firms matched with government procurement contracts. Compared with noncontractors, private contractors experience larger increases in accounts receivable and deterioration in financial conditions, leading to fewer investments, worse operating performance, and higher probabilities of ownership changes. The effects are muted among stateowned enterprises, which demonstrate lower productivity. Our findings thus reveal a reverse crowding-in effect whereby government deleveraging adversely affects private firms and reduces allocative efficiency.