Can Stablecoins Be Stable?

• 成果类型: Article; Early Access
• 署名作者: d'Avernas, Adrien; Maurin, Vincent; Vandeweyer, Quentin
• 署名单位: Stockholm School of Economics; Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris; University of Chicago
• 刊物名称: MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0025-1909
• DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2024.06992
• 发表日期: 2026
• 关键词: decentralized finance; Cryptocurrencies; currency peg; Coase conjecture

摘要

This paper provides a general model of stablecoins, cryptocurrencies pegged to a traditional currency. We characterize the optimal design of a stablecoin protocol that generates seigniorage fees from issuance. We use this framework to assess the ability of various protocol designs to maintain the peg. Our model rationalizes algorithmic backing of stablecoins but highlights its greater fragility relative to collateralization. Immutable smart contracts improve stability because the issuer suffers from a commitment problem. Even under full collateralization, promises to repurchase stablecoins when demand drops are not credible. Alternatively, the protocol can restore commitment by decentralizing issuance, and this highlights a new benefit of DeFi protocols.