Stability Certificates for Receding-Horizon Games
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Hall, Sophie; Belgioioso, Giuseppe; Dorfler, Florian; Liao-McPherson, Dominic
署名单位：
Swiss Federal Institutes of Technology Domain; ETH Zurich; Royal Institute of Technology; University of British Columbia
刊物名称：
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON AUTOMATIC CONTROL
ISSN/ISSBN：
0018-9286
DOI：
10.1109/TAC.2025.3647314
发表日期：
2026
关键词：
摘要：
Game-theoretic model predictive control (or receding horizon games) is an emerging control methodology for multiagent systems that generates control actions by solving a dynamic game with coupling constraints in a receding-horizon fashion. This control paradigm has recently received increasing attention in various application fields, including robotics, autonomous driving, traffic networks, and energy grids, due to its ability to model the competitive nature of self-interested agents with shared resources while incorporating future predictions, dynamic models, and constraints into the decision-making process. In this work, we present the first formal stability analysis based on dissipativity and monotone operator theory that is valid also for nonpotential games. Specifically, we derive linear matrix inequality-based certificates that ensure asymptotic stability and are numerically verifiable. Moreover, we show that, if the agents have decoupled dynamics, then the numerical verification can be performed in a scalable manner. Finally, we present tuning guidelines for the agents' cost function weights to fulfill the certificates and, thus, ensure stability.