Removing the fine print: Disclosure, standardized products, and consumer outcomes

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Kulkarni, Sheisha; Truffa, Santiago; Iberti, Gonzalo
• 署名单位: University of Virginia; Universidad Adolfo Ibanez; University Diego Portales
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-405X
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2026.104353
• 发表日期: 2026-11
• 页码: 104353
• 关键词: Contract design; complexity; Consumer financial protection; disclosure; standardization; information disclosure; credit; MARKET

摘要

Hidden fees can distort consumer decision-making. In response, regulators historically have (a) improved disclosure to make fees more salient or (b) standardized products to restrict what fees can be charged. We use Chilean administrative data and a multi-stage natural experiment to separately identify the effects of disclosure and standardization on repayment. We find that disclosure reduces delinquencies by 13.7 percentage points (40%) and default by 1.68 percentage points (98%), whereas standardization has no effect. We find no effect on initial loan terms, suggesting that disclosure's effects are specific to repayment behavior: specifically, disclosure improves borrowers' understanding of their credit obligations.