Board connections, firm profitability, and product market actions

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Gopalan, Radhakrishnan; Li, Renping; Zaldokas, Alminas
• 署名单位: Washington University (WUSTL); Tulane University; National University of Singapore
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-405X
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2026.104332
• 发表日期: 2026-09
• 页码: 104332
• 关键词: Board of directors; interlocking directorships; Product market coordination; ANTITRUST; DIRECTORS; COMMUNICATION; COMPETITION; RISK; industries; OWNERSHIP; expertise; collusion; busyness; mergers

摘要

A firm's gross margin increases by 0.8 p.p. after forming a new direct board connection to a product market peer. Gross margin also rises by 0.4 p.p. after a connection is formed to a peer indirectly through a third intermediate firm. Further, using barcode-level data of 2.7 million products, we show that new board connections are related to higher consumer good prices, a greater tendency for market allocation, and slower new product introductions. The effects are stronger when the newly connected peers share corporate customers or have similar business descriptions and hold when controlling for other inter-firm relationships.