The incentives of SPAC sponsors

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Feng, Felix; Nohel, Tom; Tian, Xuan; Wang, Wenyu; Wu, Yufeng
• 署名单位: University System of Georgia; University of Georgia; Loyola University Chicago; Peking University; Indiana University System; IU Kelley School of Business; Indiana University Bloomington; University System of Ohio; Ohio State University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-405X
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2025.104220
• 发表日期: 2026-03
• 页码: 104220
• 关键词: SPAC; Agency cost; information friction; structural estimation; PURPOSE ACQUISITION COMPANIES; IPO; COSTS

摘要

Special Purpose Acquisition Companies (SPACs) took Wall Street by storm in 2020/2021 and continue to play a significant role in today's capital markets. Estimating a structural model using a hand-collected comprehensive dataset, we find that SPACs add value by identifying and bringing high-potential firms to public markets, though contractual frictions skew the distribution of spoils away from SPAC shareholders and towards sponsors and target owners. Nonetheless, shareholder excess returns are positive once redemptions are accounted for. Policy analyses reveal that earnout provisions enhance welfare, while modest improvements in disclosure and limits on warrant usage have minimal impact on improving outcomes.