Flying below the radar: Insider trading by executives below the top

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Hvide, Hans K.; Nielsen, Kasper Meisner
• 署名单位: University of Bergen; Copenhagen Business School
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-405X
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2026.104282
• 发表日期: 2026-07
• 页码: 104282
• 关键词: Insider trading; Executives below the top; TOP EXECUTIVES; Inside information; Material information; INFORMATION; performance; investors; accounts; returns; profits; COSTS; tests

摘要

To enforce insider trading laws, financial regulators require top executives to make their own-company trades public. One implication of this regulatory focus is that executives below the top fly under the radar. We use administrative register data from Norway to examine whether executives below the top in listed companies earn abnormal returns on purchases in own-company stock. We find evidence of abnormal returns on such trades, about 50 to 100 basis points at the 1-month horizon. The abnormal returns on purchases in other stocks are negative, making high investor ability an unlikely explanation.