Collective Moral Hazard, Risk Sharing, and Banking Unions*

• 成果类型: Article; Early Access
• 署名作者: Segura, Anatoli; Vicente, Sergio
• 署名单位: European Central Bank; Bank of Italy; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; University of Luxembourg
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0893-9454; 1465-7368
• DOI: 10.1093/rfs/hhag024
• 发表日期: 2026-05-21
• 关键词: G01; G20; G28; Deposit insurance; sovereign; COMPETITION

摘要

We analyze optimal cross-country risk sharing and bank capital requirements amid collective moral hazard by governments and banks. Transfers provide insurance but weaken fiscal discipline. Since lenient fiscal policies amplify banks' risk-shifting, optimal support must be contingent on banking system health. For fiscally weak countries, support is larger in sovereign crises with solvent banks. For fiscally strong countries, support is larger in joint sovereign and bank crises, requiring deposit insurance mutualization. Optimal contracts feature lower capital requirements than without cross-country transfers, raising the cost of joint sovereign and bank crises to strengthen fiscal discipline and enable greater risk sharing.