Too Many Managers: The Strategic Use of Titles to Avoid Overtime Payments

• 成果类型: Article; Early Access
• 署名作者: Cohen, Lauren H.; Gurun, Umit G.; Ozel, N. Bugra
• 署名单位: Harvard University; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Texas System; University of Texas Dallas
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0893-9454; 1465-7368
• DOI: 10.1093/rfs/hhag016
• 发表日期: 2026-05-13
• 关键词: M51; M54; G30; G38; WORK LAWS; LEGAL CONSCIOUSNESS; LABOR; determinants; FIRMS; wages

摘要

We find widespread evidence that firms avoid overtime payments by strategically assigning managerial titles. Exploiting the exemption threshold under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), we find managerial titles increase almost fivefold just above the overtime pay cutoff, including suspect listings, such as Director of First Impressions for a role equivalent to Front-Desk Clerk. Avoidance is higher when firms have more bargaining power and are financially constrained. It is also more common in occupations with volatile demand and unpredictable worker scheduling. Patterns align with litigation and Department of Labor enforcement. Firms avoid roughly 13.5% in compensation costs, hiring strategic managers.