How Financial Markets Create Superstars

• 成果类型: Article; Early Access
• 署名作者: Terovitis, Spyros; Vladimirov, Vladimir
• 署名单位: University of Amsterdam
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0893-9454; 1465-7368
• DOI: 10.1093/rfs/hhag015
• 发表日期: 2026-04-06
• 关键词: D62; D82; D84; G30; stock-prices; manipulation; feedback; recommendations; INFORMATION; INVESTMENT; incentives; BEHAVIOR; analysts

摘要

By aggregating information into stock prices, financial markets help guide the allocation of resources. We show that speculators without information about firms' fundamentals can exploit this role of prices and profit from inflating firm valuations. Uninformed speculation is profitable because high valuations attract employees, business partners, and investors, creating value at targeted firms at the cost of diverting resources from better firms. Both large and small speculators, without pre-existing stock positions, can profit from uninformed speculation, particularly when targeting firms with moderate Q, operating in normal (neither hot nor cold) markets, and using performance pay or equity to attract stakeholders.