Platform Disintermediation with Repeated Transactions

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Enache, Andreea; Rhodes, Andrew
• 署名单位: Stockholm School of Economics; Communaute d'universites et etablissements de Toulouse (Comue); Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics
• 刊物名称: MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0025-1909
• DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2025.02150
• 发表日期: 2026
• 关键词: platforms; Disintermediation; convenience benefits; repeat transactions

摘要

We consider a setting in which a platform matches buyers and sellers, who then wish to transact with each other multiple times. The platform charges fees for hosting transactions but also offers convenience benefits. We consider two scenarios. In one scenario, all transactions must occur on the platform; in the other scenario, buyers and sellers can disintermediate the platform after the first transaction and do subsequent transactions offline. We find that the platform reacts to disintermediation by using a front-loaded pricing scheme, whereby it charges more for earlier transactions. We also show that sometimes the platform is better off when disintermediation is possible-because it can use disintermediation to screen users' private information about their convenience benefits. Buyers are not necessarily better off when they can disintermediate due to the way in which the platform adjusts its fees.