Costly Rewards Sustain Cooperation with Imperfect Monitoring

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Pan, Jingjing; Li, Jianbiao; Niu, Xiaofei; Zhu, Chengkang
• 署名单位: University of Jinan; Shandong University; Nankai University
• 刊物名称: MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0025-1909
• DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2024.06479
• 发表日期: 2026
• 关键词: Public goods games; reward; imperfect information; COOPERATION

摘要

This research examines the role of reward systems in enhancing cooperation, particularly when individual contributions are not fully transparent. We investigate the impact of reward mechanisms on cooperative behavior using an experimental setup known as the Voluntary Contribution Mechanism with Rewards. Our experimental design compares centralized reward (CR) systems, where an authority distributes rewards, with decentralized reward (DR) systems, where peers allocate rewards, against a no-reward baseline. The results reveal that CR generally promotes the highest level of cooperation, whereas DR achieves the greatest economic efficiency across all test environments. Participants also exhibited a strong preference for CR. These findings contribute to the existing literature by highlighting the effectiveness of reward systems in mitigating social dilemmas under conditions of imperfect information. The study offers vital insights for policymakers and organizational members in selecting incentive mechanisms that foster sustained collective action, even when individual efforts are not directly observable.