The Need for Absorptive Capacity Alleviates the Free-Rider Problem in Knowledge Production

• 成果类型: Article; Early Access
• 署名作者: Denrell, Jerker; Luukkonen, Jerry; Chater, Nick; Liu, Chengwei
• 署名单位: University of Warwick; Imperial College London
• 刊物名称: MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0025-1909
• DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2024.06471
• 发表日期: 2026
• 关键词: Absorptive capacity; Organizational learning; Knowledge production; knowledge sharing

摘要

Knowledge sharing is central to strategy and organizational learning, yet its effect on knowledge production remains underexplored. When knowledge diffuses too easily, individuals may free ride on others' costly knowledge production, creating a suboptimal equilibrium in which knowledge sharing persists but the average payoff is no greater than if everyone produced knowledge independently-the so-called Rogers' paradox. We develop a game-theoretic model to re-examine this puzzle. In our baseline model, we reproduce Rogers' paradox; frictionless sharing does not increase performance beyond individual knowledge production alone. We then extend the model to incorporate absorptive capacity-the need for prior investment in one's own knowledge before learning from others. Absorptive capacity discourages pure free riding. Counterintuitively, although it introduces frictions in knowledge sharing, absorptive capacity increases collective knowledge production beyond the level attainable through individual knowledge production alone. This explains why extensive knowledge sharing in domains such as academia does not erode incentives for knowledge production. It also contributes to knowledge-based theories of the firm by showing that although hierarchical control may be crucial in contexts where knowledge is simple and codifiable, it may not be necessary where knowledge is complex and tacit. More broadly, our analysis illustrates how formal modeling can uncover overlooked mechanisms and integrate insights across cultural evolution, organizational learning, and strategy.