Borrowing from Friends of Friends: Indirect Social Networks and Bank Loans

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Huang, Sterling; Li, Bo; Massa, Massimo; Yang, Siyuan; Zhang, Hong
• 署名单位: New York University; NYU Shanghai; Peking University; INSEAD Business School; University of International Business & Economics; Singapore Management University
• 刊物名称: MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0025-1909
• DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2024.07536
• 发表日期: 2026
• 关键词: Social networks; indirect connections; bank loans; Loan spreads; covenants

摘要

We examine how indirect connections (i.e., friends of friends), an important yet understudied feature of social networks, may affect bank loan contracts. Using a sample of bank loans issued by U.S. public firms, we find that indirect networks built on board interlocks significantly reduce loan spreads. However, bank monitoring and loan quality are negatively affected, suggesting that indirect networks may give rise to favoritism treatment by banks. A novel set of difference-in-difference tests exploiting changes in higher-order network structures provides the network foundation and lends support to a causal interpretation of our findings. Overall, our results suggest that indirect connections within social networks, specifically through board interlocks, can have significant economic impacts on bank loan contracts.